Publications proposing novel machine learning methods are often primarily rated by exhibited predictive performance on selected problems. In this position paper we argue that predictive performance alone is not a good indicator for the worth of a publication. Using it as such even fosters problems like inefficiencies of the machine learning research community as a whole and setting wrong incentives for researchers. We therefore put out a call for the publication of ``negative'' results, which can help alleviate some of these problems and improve the scientific output of the machine learning research community. To substantiate our position, we present the advantages of publishing negative results and provide concrete measures for the community to move towards a paradigm where their publication is normalized.

Independent evaluation and red teaming are critical for identifying the risks posed by generative AI systems. However, the terms of service and enforcement strategies used by prominent AI companies to deter model misuse have disincentives on good faith safety evaluations. This causes some researchers to fear that conducting such research or releasing their findings will result in account suspensions or legal reprisal. Although some companies offer researcher access programs, they are an inadequate substitute for independent research access, as they have limited community representation, receive inadequate funding, and lack independence from corporate incentives. We propose that major generative AI developers commit to providing a legal and technical safe harbor, protecting public interest safety research and removing the threat of account suspensions or legal reprisal. These proposals emerged from our collective experience conducting safety, privacy, and trustworthiness research on generative AI systems, where norms and incentives could be better aligned with public interests, without exacerbating model misuse. We believe these commitments are a necessary step towards more inclusive and unimpeded community efforts to tackle the risks of generative AI.

The performance of differentially private machine learning can be boosted significantly by leveraging the transfer learning capabilities of non-private models pretrained on large public datasets. We critically review this approach. We primarily question whether the use of large Web-scraped datasets should be viewed as differential-privacy-preserving. We further scrutinize whether existing machine learning benchmarks are appropriate for measuring the ability of pretrained models to generalize to sensitive domains. Finally, we observe that reliance on large pretrained models may lose other forms of privacy, requiring data to be outsourced to a more compute-powerful third party.

What is agency, and why does it matter? In this work, we draw from the political science and philosophy literature and give two competing visions of what it means to be an (ethical) agent. The first view, which we term mechanistic, is commonly— and implicitly—assumed in AI research, yet it is a fundamentally limited means to understand the ethical characteristics of AI. Under the second view, which we term volitional, AI can no longer be considered an ethical agent. We discuss the implications of each of these views for two critical questions: first, what the ideal system “ought” to look like, and second, how accountability may be achieved. In light of this discussion, we ultimately argue that, in the context of ethically-significant behavior, AI should be viewed not as an agent but as the outcome of political processes.