Workshop
Agentic Markets Workshop
Xinyuan Sun 路 Anisoara Calinescu 路 Christian Schroeder de Witt 路 Georgios Piliouras 路 Dawn Song 路 Thomas Thiery 路 Hawra Milani 路 Klaudia Krawiecka
Stolz 2
Sat 27 Jul, midnight PDT
This is a workshop proposal, targeting the intersection of Agentic AI and Market/Incentives Design.Workshop Summary: Recent developments in foundation models have paved the way for the wide adoption of AI agents that interact with humans and each other. The cooperation and safety of those models are a necessity, especially as they gain autonomy and participate in high stakes markets as autonomous systems, making those markets "agentic." However, those agentic markets face significant challenges as most existing methods at improving their performance and robustness presume critical use of policy and regulation, which are insufficient and too slow for an economy driven by a mixture of human and algorithmic participants, especially in zero-shot scenarios.As we advance towards an AI-centric future, the emergence of markets, mechanisms, and mediation platforms dedicated to preference elicitation and resource allocation for those highly agentic systems is inevitable. We expect many existing multi-agent security and cooperation approaches to break in high-stakes situations where hyper-adversarial incentives are present. This is compounded by the emergence of complexity from AI interactions, exemplified by intricate interdependencies within agentic systems.Given this complexity, how can we fully understand and assess the associated risks? How can we improve the performance and robustness of these markets? It is essential to draw lessons from traditional markets with less agentic AI (e.g., finance), to achieve robust incentives and economic security in a post-foundation model world. We recognize the need to incorporate principles of cryptography and robust market design. However, the sufficiency of these approaches is not certain. We aim to identify the missing elements and treat the sudy of market design in presence of agentic AI as a scientific discipline.This workshop seeks to amalgamate insights from economics, mechanism design, game theory, and, crucially, real-world financial markets expertise for algorithmic agents to better prepare us for the inevitable mass adoption of agentic AI on mission critical jobs. We aspire for this workshop to enlighten participants about new agentic-driven risks and opportunities, fostering disruptive collaborations among economists, market stakeholders, and AI researchers.ICML is the perfect venue for this workshop as it鈥檚 the focal point for a wide range of AI researchers and industry practitioners who have informed opinions on agentic systems. This interdisciplinary assembly is crucial for stimulating discussions that blend market design and economics with practical insights from the auctions and finance sector. We envision ICML as the perfect platform to nurture a scientific understanding of agentic markets. It is also the prime setting for enabling influential decision-makers and researchers to exchange knowledge and receive feedback, thereby facilitating impactful changes in the real world.
Schedule
Sat 12:00 a.m. - 12:10 a.m.
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Opening remarks
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 12:10 a.m. - 12:30 a.m.
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Invited talk: Gillian Hadfield
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 12:30 a.m. - 12:50 a.m.
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Invited talk: Gabriele Farina
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 12:50 a.m. - 1:10 a.m.
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Invited talk: Ian Gemp
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 1:10 a.m. - 2:00 a.m.
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Online Panel: Costis Daskalakis,Tuomas Sandholm
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 2:00 a.m. - 2:20 a.m.
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Oral: Mechanism Design for Large Language Models
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 2:20 a.m. - 2:40 a.m.
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Oral: Scalable AI Safety via Doubly-Efficient Debate
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 2:40 a.m. - 3:00 a.m.
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Oral: On Three-Layer Data Markets
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 3:00 a.m. - 3:20 a.m.
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Oral: Get It Cooperating: Enhancing Generative Agent Cooperation with Commitment Devices
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 5:00 a.m. - 5:20 a.m.
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Oral: Playing Large Games with Oracles and AI Debate
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 5:20 a.m. - 5:40 a.m.
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Oral: Consistency Checks for Language Model Forecasters
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 5:40 a.m. - 6:00 a.m.
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Invited talk: Sumitra Ganesh
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 6:00 a.m. - 6:20 a.m.
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Invited talk: Barnab茅 Monnot
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 6:20 a.m. - 6:40 a.m.
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Invited talk: Stefanos Leonardos
SlidesLive Video |
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Sat 7:50 a.m. - 8:00 a.m.
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Closing Remarks
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Shall We Team Up: Exploring Spontaneous Cooperation of Competing LLM Agents ( Poster ) > link | Zengqing Wu 路 Brian Kwon 路 Shuyuan Zheng 路 Qianying Liu 路 Xu Han 路 Makoto Onizuka 路 Shaojie Tang 路 Run Peng 路 Chuan Xiao 馃敆 |
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Learning Stable Allocations of Strictly Convex Stochastic Cooperative Games ( Poster ) > link | Nam Tran 路 The-Anh Ta 路 Shuqing Shi 路 Debmalya Mandal 路 Yali Du 路 Long Tran-Thanh 馃敆 |
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Slow Games ( Poster ) > link | D Reusche 路 Christopher Goes 路 Nicolas Della Penna 馃敆 |
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STRIDE: A Tool-Assisted LLM Agent Framework for Strategic and Interactive Decision-Making ( Poster ) > link | Chuanhao Li 路 Runhan Yang 路 Tiankai Li 路 Milad Bafarassat 路 Kourosh Sharifi 路 Dirk Bergemann 路 Zhuoran Yang 馃敆 |
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Polynomial Convergence of Bandit No-Regret Dynamics in Congestion Games ( Poster ) > link | Leello Dadi 路 Ioannis Panageas 路 EFSTRATIOS PANTELEIMON SKOULAKIS 路 Luca Viano 路 Volkan Cevher 馃敆 |
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Ethereum AI Agent Coordinator (EAAC): A Framework for AI Agent Activity Coordination ( Poster ) > link | Taehoon Kim 馃敆 |
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LLMs at the Bargaining Table ( Poster ) > link | Yuan Deng 路 Vahab Mirrokni 路 Renato Leme 路 Hanrui Zhang 路 Song Zuo 馃敆 |
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The Consensus Game: Language Model Generation via Equilibrium Search ( Poster ) > link | Athul Jacob 路 Yikang Shen 路 Gabriele Farina 路 Jacob Andreas 馃敆 |
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Composable Contracts for Multi-Agent Coordination ( Poster ) > link | Christy Chen 路 Louis Parker 馃敆 |
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Serial Monopoly on Blockchains with Quasi-patient Users ( Poster ) > link | Paolo Penna 路 Manvir Schneider 馃敆 |
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Playing Large Games with Oracles and AI Debate ( Oral ) > link | Xinyi Chen 路 Angelica Chen 路 Dean Foster 路 Elad Hazan 馃敆 |
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To Compete or To Collude: Builder Incentives in MEV-Boost Auctions ( Poster ) > link | Fei Wu 路 Thomas Thiery 路 Stefanos Leonardos 路 Carmine Ventre 馃敆 |
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CompeteAI: Understanding the Competition Dynamics of Large Language Model-based Agents ( Poster ) > link | Qinlin Zhao 路 Jindong Wang 路 Yixuan Zhang 路 Yiqiao Jin 路 Kaijie Zhu 路 Hao Chen 路 Xing Xie 馃敆 |
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Truthful Aggregation of LLMs\\ with an Application to Online Advertising ( Poster ) > link | Ermis Soumalias 路 Michael Curry 路 Sven Seuken 馃敆 |
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Scalable Approaches for a Theory of Many Minds ( Poster ) > link | Maximilian Puelma Touzel 路 Amin Memarian 路 Matthew Riemer 路 Andrei Mircea 路 Andrew Williams 路 Elin Ahlstrand 路 Lucas Lehnert 路 Rupali Bhati 路 Guillaume Dumas 路 Irina Rish 馃敆 |
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Do LLM Agents Have Regret? A Case Study in Online Learning and Games ( Poster ) > link | Chanwoo Park 路 Xiangyu Liu 路 Asuman Ozdaglar 路 Kaiqing Zhang 馃敆 |
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WebCanvas: Benchmarking Web Agents in Online Environments ( Poster ) > link |
11 presentersYichen Pan 路 Dehan Kong 路 Sida Zhou 路 Cheng Cui 路 Yifei Leng 路 Bing Jiang 路 Hangyu Liu 路 Yanni Shawn 路 Shuyan Zhou 路 Sherry Tongshuang Wu 路 Zhengyang Wu |
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Scalable AI Safety via Doubly-Efficient Debate ( Oral ) > link | Jonah Brown-Cohen 路 Geoffrey Irving 路 Georgios Piliouras 馃敆 |
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Collaborative Learning under Strategic Behavior: Mechanisms for Eliciting Feedback in Principal-Agent Bandit Games ( Poster ) > link | Ramakrishnan Krishnamurthy 路 Arpit Agarwal 路 Lakshminarayanan Subramanian 路 Maximilian Nickel 馃敆 |
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Altared Environments: The Role of Normative Infrastructure in AI Alignment ( Poster ) > link | Rakshit Trivedi 路 Nikhil Chandak 路 Carter Blair 路 Atrisha Sarkar 路 Tehilla Weltman 路 Dylan Hadfield-Menell 路 Gillian Hadfield 馃敆 |
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RouterBench: A Benchmark for Multi-LLM Routing System ( Poster ) > link | Qitian Hu 路 Jacob Bieker 路 Xiuyu Li 路 Nan Jiang 路 Benjamin Keigwin 路 Gaurav Ranganath 路 EECS Kurt Keutzer 路 Shriyash Upadhyay 馃敆 |
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Collusion of Reinforcement Learning-based Pricing Algorithms in Episodic Markets ( Poster ) > link | Paul Friedrich 路 Barna Pasztor 路 Giorgia Ramponi 馃敆 |
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Performative Prediction on Games and Mechanism Design ( Poster ) > link | Antonio Gois 路 Mehrnaz Mofakhami 路 Fernando Santos 路 Simon Lacoste-Julien 路 Gauthier Gidel 馃敆 |
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Deep Reinforcement Learning for Equilibrium Computation in Multi-Stage Auctions and Contests ( Poster ) > link | Fabian Raoul Pieroth 路 Nils Kohring 路 Martin Bichler 馃敆 |
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On Three-Layer Data Markets ( Oral ) > link | Alireza Fallah 路 Michael Jordan 路 Ali Makhdoumi 路 azarakhsh malekian 馃敆 |
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Data as a Consumable Resource ( Poster ) > link | Dar Gilboa 路 Siddhartha Jain 路 Jarrod McClean 馃敆 |
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Steering Language Models with Game-Theoretic Solvers ( Poster ) > link | Ian Gemp 路 Roma Patel 路 Yoram Bachrach 路 Marc Lanctot 路 Vibhavari Dasagi 路 Luke Marris 路 Georgios Piliouras 路 Siqi Liu 路 Karl Tuyls 馃敆 |
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Bilevel Optimization with Lower-Level Contextual MDPs ( Poster ) > link | Vinzenz Thoma 路 Barna Pasztor 路 Andreas Krause 路 Giorgia Ramponi 路 Yifan Hu 馃敆 |
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Consistency Checks for Language Model Forecasters ( Oral ) > link | Abhimanyu Pallavi Sudhir 路 Alejandro Alvarez 路 Adam Shen 路 Daniel Paleka 馃敆 |
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Mechanism Design for Large Language Models ( Oral ) > link | PAUL DUETTING 路 Vahab Mirrokni 路 Renato Leme 路 Haifeng Xu 路 Song Zuo 馃敆 |