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Poster

in

Workshop: The Many Facets of Preference-Based Learning

## Uncoupled and Convergent Learning in Two-Player Zero-Sum Markov Games

### Yang Cai · Haipeng Luo · Chen-Yu Wei · Weiqiang Zheng

Abstract:
We revisit the problem of learning in two-player zero-sum Markov games, focusing on developing an algorithm that is *uncoupled*, *convergent*, and *rational*, with non-asymptotic convergence rates to Nash equilibrium. We start from the case of stateless matrix game with bandit feedback as a warm-up, showing an $\mathcal{O}(t^{-\frac{1}{8}})$ last-iterate convergence rate. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first result that obtains finite last-iterate convergence rate given access to only bandit feedback. We extend our result to the case of irreducible Markov games, providing a last-iterate convergence rate of $\mathcal{O}(t^{-\frac{1}{9+\varepsilon}})$ for any $\varepsilon>0$. Finally, we study Markov games without any assumptions on the dynamics, and show a *path convergence* rate, a new notion of convergence we define, of $\mathcal{O}(t^{-\frac{1}{10}})$. Our algorithm removes the synchronization and prior knowledge requirement of [Wei et al, 2021], which pursued the same goals as us for irreducible Markov games. Our algorithm is related to [Chen et al., 2021, Cen et al., 2021] and also builds on the entropy regularization technique. However, we remove their requirement of communications on the entropy values, making our algorithm entirely uncoupled.

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