Since reinforcement learning algorithms are notoriously data-intensive, the task of sampling observations from the environment is usually split across multiple agents. However, transferring these observations from the agents to a central location can be prohibitively expensive in terms of the communication cost, and it can also compromise the privacy of each agent's local behavior policy. In this paper, we consider a federated reinforcement learning framework where multiple agents collaboratively learn a global model, without sharing their individual data and policies. Each agent maintains a local copy of the model and updates it using locally sampled data. Although having N agents enables the sampling of N times more data, it is not clear if it leads to proportional convergence speedup. We propose federated versions of on-policy TD, off-policy TD and Q-learning, and analyze their convergence. For all these algorithms, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider Markovian noise and multiple local updates, and prove a linear convergence speedup with respect to the number of agents. To obtain these results, we show that federated TD and Q-learning are special cases of a general framework for federated stochastic approximation with Markovian noise, and we leverage this framework to provide a unified convergence analysis that applies to all the algorithms.

We study the entropic Gromov-Wasserstein and its unbalanced version between (unbalanced) Gaussian distributions with different dimensions. When the metric is the inner product, which we refer to as inner product Gromov-Wasserstein (IGW), we demonstrate that the optimal transportation plans of entropic IGW and its unbalanced variant are (unbalanced) Gaussian distributions. Via an application of von Neumann's trace inequality, we obtain closed-form expressions for the entropic IGW between these Gaussian distributions. Finally, we consider an entropic inner product Gromov-Wasserstein barycenter of multiple Gaussian distributions. We prove that the barycenter is a Gaussian distribution when the entropic regularization parameter is small. We further derive a closed-form expression for the covariance matrix of the barycenter.

Auctions with partially-revealed information about items are broadly employed in real-world applications, but the underlying mechanisms have limited theoretical support. In this work, we study a machine learning formulation of these types of mechanisms, presenting algorithms that are no-regret from the buyer's perspective. Specifically, a buyer who wishes to maximize his utility interacts repeatedly with a platform over a series of $T$ rounds. In each round, a new item is drawn from an unknown distribution and the platform publishes a price together with incomplete, ``masked'' information about the item. The buyer then decides whether to purchase the item. We formalize this problem as an online learning task where the goal is to have low regret with respect to a myopic oracle that has perfect knowledge of the distribution over items and the seller's masking function. When the distribution over items is known to the buyer and the mask is a SimHash function mapping $\R^d$ to $\{0,1\}^{\ell}$, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Td\ell)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$. In a fully agnostic setting when the mask is an arbitrary function mapping to a set of size $n$ and the prices are stochastic, our algorithm has regret $\tilde \cO((Tn)^{\nicefrac{1}{2}})$.

Most existing results about last-iterate convergence of learning dynamics are limited to two-player zero-sum games, and only apply under rigid assumptions about what dynamics the players follow. In this paper we provide new results and techniques that apply to broader families of games and learning dynamics. First, we show that in a class of games that includes constant-sum polymatrix and strategically zero-sum games, the trajectories of dynamics such as optimistic mirror descent (OMD) exhibit a boundedness property, which holds even when players employ different algorithms and prediction mechanisms. This property enables us to obtain $O(1/\sqrt{T})$ rates and optimal $O(1)$ regret bounds. Our analysis also reveals a surprising property: OMD either reaches arbitrarily close to a Nash equilibrium or it outperforms the robust price of anarchy in efficiency. Moreover, for potential games we establish convergence to an $\epsilon$-equilibrium after $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ iterations for mirror descent under a broad class of regularizers, as well as optimal $O(1)$ regret bounds for OMD variants. Our framework also extends to near-potential games, and unifies known analyses for distributed learning in Fisher's market model. Finally, we analyze the convergence, efficiency, and robustness of optimistic gradient descent (OGD) in general-sum continuous games.

While extensive-form games (EFGs) can be converted into normal-form games (NFGs), doing so comes at the cost of an exponential blowup of the strategy space. So, progress on NFGs and EFGs has historically followed separate tracks, with the EFG community often having to catch up with advances (\eg last-iterate convergence and predictive regret bounds) from the larger NFG community. In this paper we show that the Optimistic Multiplicative Weights Update (OMWU) algorithm---the premier learning algorithm for NFGs---can be simulated on the normal-form equivalent of an EFG in linear time per iteration in the game tree size using a kernel trick. The resulting algorithm, \emph{Kernelized OMWU (KOMWU)}, applies more broadly to all convex games whose strategy space is a polytope with 0/1 integral vertices, as long as the kernel can be evaluated efficiently. In the particular case of EFGs, KOMWU closes several standing gaps between NFG and EFG learning, by enabling direct, black-box transfer to EFGs of desirable properties of learning dynamics that were so far known to be achievable only in NFGs. Specifically, KOMWU gives the first algorithm that guarantees at the same time last-iterate convergence, lower dependence on the size of the game tree than all prior algorithms, and $\tilde{\bigOh}(1)$ regret when followed by all players.

This paper proposes an extension of a popular decentralized discrete-time learning procedure when repeating a static game called fictitious play (FP) (Brown, 1951; Robinson, 1951) to a dynamic model called discounted stochastic game (Shapley, 1953). Our family of discrete-time FP procedures is proven to converge to the set of stationary Nash equilibria in identical interest discounted stochastic games. This extends similar convergence results for static games (Monderer & Shapley, 1996a). We then analyze the continuous-time counterpart of our FP procedures, which include as a particular case the best-response dynamic introduced and studied by Leslie et al. (2020) in the context of zero-sum stochastic games. We prove the converge of this dynamics to stationary Nash equilibria in identical-interest and zero-sum discounted stochastic games. Thanks to stochastic approximations, we can infer from the continuous-time convergence some discrete time results such as the convergence to stationary equilibria in zero-sum and team stochastic games (Holler, 2020).

Interior point methods (IPMs) are a common approach for solving linear programs (LPs) with strong theoretical guarantees and solid empirical performance. The time complexity of these methods is dominated by the cost of solving a linear system of equations at each iteration. In common applications of linear programming, particularly in machine learning and scientific computing, the size of this linear system can become prohibitively large, requiring the use of iterative solvers, which provide an approximate solution to the linear system. However, approximately solving the linear system at each iteration of an IPM invalidates the theoretical guarantees of common IPM analyses. To remedy this, we theoretically and empirically analyze (slightly modified) predictor-corrector IPMs when using approximate linear solvers: our approach guarantees that, when certain conditions are satisfied, the number of IPM iterations does not increase and that the final solution remains feasible. We also provide practical instantiations of approximate linear solvers that satisfy these conditions for special classes of constraint matrices using randomized linear algebra.

In many online decision processes, the optimizing agent is called to choose between large numbers of alternatives with many inherent similarities; in turn, these similarities imply closely correlated losses that may confound standard discrete choice models and bandit algorithms. We study this question in the context of nested bandits, a class of adversarial multi-armed bandit problems where the learner seeks to minimize their regret in the presence of a large number of distinct alternatives with a hierarchy of embedded (non-combinatorial) similarities. In this setting, optimal algorithms based on the exponential weights blueprint (like Hedge, EXP3, and their variants) may incur significant regret because they tend to spend excessive amounts of time exploring irrelevant alternatives with similar, suboptimal costs. To account for this, we propose a nested exponential weights (NEW) algorithm that performs a layered exploration of the learner's set of alternatives based on a nested, step-by-step selection method. In so doing, we obtain a series of tight bounds for the learner's regret showing that online learning problems with a high degree of similarity between alternatives can be resolved efficiently, without a red bus / blue bus paradox occurring.

We initiate the study of the effects of non-transparency in decision rules on individuals' ability to improve in strategic learning settings. Inspired by real-life settings, such as loan approvals and college admissions, we remove the assumption typically made in the strategic learning literature, that the decision rule is fully known to individuals, and focus instead on settings where it is inaccessible. In their lack of knowledge, individuals try to infer this rule by learning from their peers (e.g., friends and acquaintances who previously applied for a loan), naturally forming groups in the population, each with possibly different type and level of information regarding the decision rule. We show that, in equilibrium, the principal's decision rule optimizing welfare across sub-populations may cause a strong negative externality: the true quality of some of the groups can actually deteriorate. On the positive side, we show that, in many natural cases, optimal improvement can be guaranteed simultaneously for all sub-populations. We further introduce a measure we term information overlap proxy, and demonstrate its usefulness in characterizing the disparity in improvements across sub-populations. Finally, we identify a natural condition under which improvement can be guaranteed for all sub-populations while maintaining high predictive accuracy. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments on real-world datasets.

The goal of explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is to generate human-interpretable explanations, but there are no computationally precise theories of how humans interpret AI generated explanations. The lack of theory means that validation of XAI must be done empirically, on a case-by-case basis, which prevents systematic theory-building in XAI. We propose a psychological theory of how humans draw conclusions from saliency maps, the most common form of XAI explanation, which for the first time allows for precise prediction of explainee inference conditioned on explanation. Our theory posits that absent explanation humans expect the AI to make similar decisions to themselves, and that they interpret an explanation by comparison to the explanations they themselves would give. Comparison is formalized via Shepard's universal law of generalization in a similarity space, a classic theory from cognitive science. A pre-registered user study on AI image classifications with saliency map explanations demonstrate that our theory quantitatively matches participants' predictions of the AI.

Local differential privacy (LDP) can be adopted to anonymize richer user data attributes that will be input to sophisticated machine learning (ML) tasks. However, today's LDP approaches are largely task-agnostic and often lead to severe performance loss -- they simply inject noise to all data attributes according to a given privacy budget, regardless of what features are most relevant for the ultimate task. In this paper, we address how to significantly improve the ultimate task performance with multi-dimensional user data by considering a task-aware privacy preservation problem. The key idea is to use an encoder-decoder framework to learn (and anonymize) a task-relevant latent representation of user data. We obtain an analytical near-optimal solution for the linear setting with mean-squared error (MSE) task loss. We also provide an approximate solution through a gradient-based learning algorithm for general nonlinear cases. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our task-aware approach significantly improves ultimate task accuracy compared to standard benchmark LDP approaches with the same level of privacy guarantee.

Humans have come to rely on machines for reducing excessive information to manageable representations. But this reliance can be abused -- strategic machines might craft representations that manipulate their users. How can a user make good choices based on strategic representations? We formalize this as a learning problem, and pursue algorithms for decision-making that are robust to manipulation.In our main setting of interest, the system represents attributes of an item to the user, who then decides whether or not to consume. We model this interaction through the lens of strategic classification (Hardt et al. 2016), reversed: the user, who learns, plays first; and the system, which responds, plays second. The system must respond with representations that reveal `nothing but the truth' but need not reveal the entire truth. Thus, the user faces the problem of learning set functionsunder strategic subset selection, which presents distinct algorithmic and statistical challenges. Our main result is a learning algorithm that minimizes error despite strategic representations, and our theoretical analysis sheds light on the trade-off between learning effort and susceptibility to manipulation.