Consensus Multiplicative Weights Update: Learning to Learn using Projector-based Game Signatures

Nelson Vadori · Rahul Savani · Thomas Spooner · Sumitra Ganesh

Hall E #1113

Keywords: [ RL: Deep RL ] [ T: Game Theory ]

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Wed 20 Jul 3:30 p.m. PDT — 5:30 p.m. PDT
Spotlight presentation: T: Game Theory/RL/Planning
Wed 20 Jul 7:30 a.m. PDT — 9 a.m. PDT


Cheung and Piliouras (2020) recently showed that two variants of the Multiplicative Weights Update method - OMWU and MWU - display opposite convergence properties depending on whether the game is zero-sum or cooperative. Inspired by this work and the recent literature on learning to optimize for single functions, we introduce a new framework for learning last-iterate convergence to Nash Equilibria in games, where the update rule's coefficients (learning rates) along a trajectory are learnt by a reinforcement learning policy that is conditioned on the nature of the game: \textit{the game signature}. We construct the latter using a new decomposition of two-player games into eight components corresponding to commutative projection operators, generalizing and unifying recent game concepts studied in the literature. We compare the performance of various update rules when their coefficients are learnt, and show that the RL policy is able to exploit the game signature across a wide range of game types. In doing so, we introduce CMWU, a new algorithm that extends consensus optimization to the constrained case, has local convergence guarantees for zero-sum bimatrix games, and show that it enjoys competitive performance on both zero-sum games with constant coefficients and across a spectrum of games when its coefficients are learnt.

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