In general-sum games the interaction of self-interested learning agents commonly leads to collectively worst-case outcomes, such as defect-defect in the iterated prisoner's dilemma (IPD). To overcome this, some methods, such as Learning with Opponent-Learning Awareness (LOLA), directly shape the learning process of their opponents. However, these methods are myopic since only a small number of steps can be anticipated, are asymmetric since they treat other agents as naive learners, and require the use of higher-order derivatives, which are calculated through white-box access to an opponent's differentiable learning algorithm. To address these issues, we propose Model-Free Opponent Shaping (M-FOS). M-FOS learns in a meta-game in which each meta-step is an episode of the underlying game. The meta-state consists of the policies in the underlying game and the meta-policy produces a new policy to be used in the next episode. M-FOS then uses generic model-free optimisation methods to learn meta-policies that accomplish long-horizon opponent shaping. Empirically, M-FOS near-optimally exploits naive learners and other, more sophisticated algorithms from the literature. For example, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first method to learn the well-known ZD extortion strategy in the IPD. In the same settings, M-FOS leads to socially optimal outcomes under meta-self-play. Finally, we show that M-FOS can be scaled to high-dimensional settings.

Dynamic mechanism design has garnered significant attention from both computer scientists and economists in recent years. By allowing agents to interact with the seller over multiple rounds, where agents’ reward functions may change with time and are state-dependent, the framework is able to model a rich class of real-world problems. In these works, the interaction between agents and sellers is often assumed to follow a Markov Decision Process (MDP). We focus on the setting where the reward and transition functions of such an MDP are not known a priori, and we are attempting to recover the optimal mechanism using an a priori collected data set. In the setting where the function approximation is employed to handle large state spaces, with only mild assumptions on the expressiveness of the function class, we are able to design a dynamic mechanism using offline reinforcement learning algorithms. Moreover, learned mechanisms approximately have three key desiderata: efficiency, individual rationality, and truthfulness. Our algorithm is based on the pessimism principle and only requires a mild assumption on the coverage of the offline data set. To the best of our knowledge, our work provides the first offline RL algorithm for dynamic mechanism design without assuming uniform coverage.

We consider model-based multi-agent reinforcement learning, where the environment transition model is unknown and can only be learned via expensive interactions with the environment. We propose H-MARL (Hallucinated Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning), a novel sample-efficient algorithm that can efficiently balance exploration, i.e., learning about the environment, and exploitation, i.e., achieve good equilibrium performance in the underlying general-sum Markov game. H-MARL builds high-probability confidence intervals around the unknown transition model and sequentially updates them based on newly observed data. Using these, it constructs an optimistic hallucinated game for the agents for which equilibrium policies are computed at each round. We consider general statistical models (e.g., Gaussian processes, deep ensembles, etc.) and policy classes (e.g., deep neural networks), and theoretically analyze our approach by bounding the agents' dynamic regret. Moreover, we provide a convergence rate to the equilibria of the underlying Markov game. We demonstrate our approach experimentally on an autonomous driving simulation benchmark. H-MARL learns successful equilibrium policies after a few interactions with the environment and can significantly improve the performance compared to non-optimistic exploration methods.

In cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning, the outcomes of agent-wise policies are highly stochastic due to the two sources of risk: (a) random actions taken by teammates and (b) random transition and rewards. Although the two sources have very distinct characteristics, existing frameworks are insufficient to control the risk-sensitivity of agent-wise policies in a disentangled manner. To this end, we propose Disentangled RIsk-sensitive Multi-Agent reinforcement learning (DRIMA) to separately access the risk sources. For example, our framework allows an agent to be optimistic with respect to teammates (who can prosocially adapt) but more risk-neutral with respect to the environment (which does not adapt). Our experiments demonstrate that DRIMA significantly outperforms prior state-of-the-art methods across various scenarios in the StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge environment. Notably, DRIMA shows robust performance where prior methods learn only a highly suboptimal policy, regardless of reward shaping, exploration scheduling, and noisy (random or adversarial) agents.

Mean Field Games (MFGs) have been introduced to efficiently approximate games with very large populations of strategic agents. Recently, the question of learning equilibria in MFGs has gained momentum, particularly using model-free reinforcement learning (RL) methods. One limiting factor to further scale up using RL is that existing algorithms to solve MFGs require the mixing of approximated quantities such as strategies or $q$-values. This is far from being trivial in the case of non-linear function approximation that enjoy good generalization properties, \textit{e.g.} neural networks. We propose two methods to address this shortcoming. The first one learns a mixed strategy from distillation of historical data into a neural network and is applied to the Fictitious Play algorithm. The second one is an online mixing method based on regularization that does not require memorizing historical data or previous estimates. It is used to extend Online Mirror Descent. We demonstrate numerically that these methods efficiently enable the use of Deep RL algorithms to solve various MFGs. In addition, we show that these methods outperform SotA baselines from the literature.

Many advances in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) are based on two common design principles: value decomposition and parameter sharing. A typical MARL algorithm of this fashion decomposes a centralized Q-function into local Q-networks with parameters shared across agents. Such an algorithmic paradigm enables centralized training and decentralized execution (CTDE) and leads to efficient learning in practice. Despite all the advantages, we revisit these two principles and show that in certain scenarios, e.g., environments with a highly multi-modal reward landscape, value decomposition, and parameter sharing can be problematic and lead to undesired outcomes. In contrast, policy gradient (PG) methods with individual policies provably converge to an optimal solution in these cases, which partially supports some recent empirical observations that PG can be effective in many MARL testbeds. Inspired by our theoretical analysis, we present practical suggestions on implementing multi-agent PG algorithms for either high rewards or diverse emergent behaviors and empirically validate our findings on a variety of domains, ranging from the simplified matrix and grid-world games to complex benchmarks such as StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge and Google Research Football. We hope our insights could benefit the community towards developing more general and more powerful MARL algorithms.

We examine global non-asymptotic convergence properties of policy gradient methods for multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) problems in Markov potential games (MPGs). To learn a Nash equilibrium of an MPG in which the size of state space and/or the number of players can be very large, we propose new independent policy gradient algorithms that are run by all players in tandem. When there is no uncertainty in the gradient evaluation, we show that our algorithm finds an $\epsilon$-Nash equilibrium with $O(1/\epsilon^2)$ iteration complexity which does not explicitly depend on the state space size. When the exact gradient is not available, we establish $O(1/\epsilon^5)$ sample complexity bound in a potentially infinitely large state space for a sample-based algorithm that utilizes function approximation. Moreover, we identify a class of independent policy gradient algorithms that enjoy convergence for both zero-sum Markov games and Markov cooperative games with the players that are oblivious to the types of games being played. Finally, we provide computational experiments to corroborate the merits and the effectiveness of our theoretical developments.

Coordination graph is a promising approach to model agent collaboration in multi-agent reinforcement learning. It conducts a graph-based value factorization and induces explicit coordination among agents to complete complicated tasks. However, one critical challenge in this paradigm is the complexity of greedy action selection with respect to the factorized values. It refers to the decentralized constraint optimization problem (DCOP), which and whose constant-ratio approximation are NP-hard problems. To bypass this systematic hardness, this paper proposes a novel method, named Self-Organized Polynomial-time Coordination Graphs (SOP-CG), which uses structured graph classes to guarantee the accuracy and the computational efficiency of collaborated action selection. SOP-CG employs dynamic graph topology to ensure sufficient value function expressiveness. The graph selection is unified into an end-to-end learning paradigm. In experiments, we show that our approach learns succinct and well-adapted graph topologies, induces effective coordination, and improves performance across a variety of cooperative multi-agent tasks.

In many real-world multi-agent systems, the sparsity of team rewards often makes it difficult for an algorithm to successfully learn a cooperative team policy. At present, the common way for solving this problem is to design some dense individual rewards for the agents to guide the cooperation. However, most existing works utilize individual rewards in ways that do not always promote teamwork and sometimes are even counterproductive. In this paper, we propose \emph{Individual Reward Assisted Team Policy Learning} (IRAT), which learns two policies for each agent from the dense individual reward and the sparse team reward with discrepancy constraints for updating the two policies mutually. Experimental results in different scenarios, such as the Multi-Agent Particle Environment and the Google Research Football Environment, show that IRAT significantly outperforms the baseline methods and can greatly promote team policy learning without deviating from the original team objective, even when the individual rewards are misleading or conflict with the team rewards.

Self-play is a common method for constructing solutions in Markov games that can yield optimal policies in collaborative settings. However, these policies often adopt highly-specialized conventions that make playing with a novel partner difficult. To address this, recent approaches rely on encoding symmetry and convention-awareness into policy training, but these require strong environmental assumptions and can complicate policy training. To overcome this, we propose moving the learning of conventions to the belief space. Specifically, we propose a belief learning paradigm that can maintain beliefs over rollouts of policies not seen at training time, and can thus decode and adapt to novel conventions at test time. We show how to leverage this belief model for both search and training of a best response over a pool of policies to greatly improve zero-shot coordination. We also show how our paradigm promotes explainability and interpretability of nuanced agent conventions.

We develop a new approach, named Greedy when Sure and Conservative when Uncertain (GSCU), to competing online against unknown and nonstationary opponents. GSCU improves in four aspects: 1) introduces a novel way of learning opponent policy embeddings offline; 2) trains offline a single best response (conditional additionally on our opponent policy embedding) instead of a finite set of separate best responses against any opponent; 3) computes online a posterior of the current opponent policy embedding, without making the discrete and ineffective decision which type the current opponent belongs to; and 4) selects online between a real-time greedy policy and a fixed conservative policy via an adversarial bandit algorithm, gaining a theoretically better regret than adhering to either. Experimental studies on popular benchmarks demonstrate GSCU's superiority over the state-of-the-art methods. The code is available online at \url{https://github.com/YeTianJHU/GSCU}.

Value decomposition (VD) methods have been widely used in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), where credit assignment plays an important role in guiding the agents’ decentralized execution. In this paper, we investigate VD from a novel perspective of causal inference. We first show that the environment in existing VD methods is an unobserved confounder as the common cause factor of the global state and the joint value function, which leads to the confounding bias on learning credit assignment. We then present our approach, deconfounded value decomposition (DVD), which cuts off the backdoor confounding path from the global state to the joint value function. The cut is implemented by introducing the \textit{trajectory graph}, which depends only on the local trajectories, as a proxy confounder. DVD is general enough to be applied to various VD methods, and extensive experiments show that DVD can consistently achieve significant performance gains over different state-of-the-art VD methods on StarCraft II and MACO benchmarks.

We study a bilevel economic system, which we refer to as a \emph{Markov exchange economy} (MEE), from the point of view of multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). An MEE involves a central planner and a group of self-interested agents. The goal of the agents is to form a Competitive Equilibrium (CE), where each agent myopically maximizes her own utility at each step. The goal of the central planner is to steer the system so as to maximize social welfare, which is defined as the sum of the utilities of all agents.Working in a setting in which the utility function and the system dynamics are both unknown, we propose to find the socially optimal policy and the CE from data via both online and offline variants of MARL. Concretely, we first devise a novel suboptimality metric specifically tailored to MEE, such that minimizing such a metric certifies globally optimal policies for both the planner and the agents. Second, in the online setting, we propose an algorithm, dubbed as \texttt{MOLM}, which combines the optimism principle for exploration with subgame CE seeking.Our algorithm can readily incorporate general function approximation tools for handling large state spaces and achieves a sublinear regret. Finally, we adapt the algorithm to an offline setting based on the pessimism principle and establish an upper bound on the suboptimality.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

Actor-critic (AC) algorithms have been widely used in decentralized multi-agent systems to learn the optimal joint control policy. However, existing decentralized AC algorithms either need to share agents' sensitive information or lack communication-efficiency. In this work, we develop decentralized AC and natural AC (NAC) algorithms that avoid sharing agents' local information and are sample and communication-efficient. In both algorithms, agents share only noisy rewards and use mini-batch local policy gradient updates to ensure high sample and communication efficiency. Particularly for decentralized NAC, we develop a decentralized Markovian SGD algorithm with an adaptive mini-batch size to efficiently compute the natural policy gradient. Under Markovian sampling and linear function approximation, we prove that the proposed decentralized AC and NAC algorithms achieve the state-of-the-art sample complexities $\mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-2}\ln\epsilon^{-1})$ and $\mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-3}\ln\epsilon^{-1})$, respectively, and achieve an improved communication complexity $\mathcal{O}(\epsilon^{-1}\ln\epsilon^{-1})$. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the proposed algorithms achieve lower sample and communication complexities than the existing decentralized AC algorithms.