Multi-Agent Training beyond Zero-Sum with Correlated Equilibrium Meta-Solvers

Luke Marris · Paul Muller · Marc Lanctot · Karl Tuyls · Thore Graepel

Keywords: [ Reinforcement Learning and Planning -> Multi-Agent RL ]


Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

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