## The Shapley Taylor Interaction Index

### Mukund Sundararajan · Kedar Dhamdhere · Ashish Agarwal

Keywords: [ Game Theory and Mechanism Design ] [ Accountability, Transparency and Interpretability ]

Abstract: The attribution problem, that is the problem of attributing a model's prediction to its base features, is well-studied. We extend the notion of attribution to also apply to feature interactions. The Shapley value is a commonly used method to attribute a model's prediction to its base features. We propose a generalization of the Shapley value called Shapley-Taylor index that attributes the model's prediction to interactions of subsets of features up to some size $k$. The method is analogous to how the truncated Taylor Series decomposes the function value at a certain point using its derivatives at a different point. In fact, we show that the Shapley Taylor index is equal to the Taylor Series of the multilinear extension of the set-theoretic behavior of the model. We axiomatize this method using the standard Shapley axioms---linearity, dummy, symmetry and efficiency---and an additional axiom that we call the interaction distribution axiom. This new axiom explicitly characterizes how interactions are distributed for a class of functions that model pure interaction. We contrast the Shapley-Taylor index against the previously proposed Shapley Interaction index from the cooperative game theory literature. We also apply the Shapley Taylor index to three models and identify interesting qualitative insights.