Reasoning aligns language models to human inference

Do language models make decisions under uncertainty like humans do? And if so, what role does extended reasoning play in the underlying decision process? We answer this question by introducing an active probabilistic reasoning task that cleanly separates sampling (actively acquiring evidence) from inference (integrating evidence towards a decision). Benchmarking humans and a broad set of contemporary LLMs against optimal reference policies reveals a consistent pattern: extended reasoning is the key determinant of strong performance, driving large gains in inference, while yielding only modest improvements in active sampling. To explain these differences, we fit a behavioral model that captures systematic deviations from optimal Bayesian behavior through interpretable parameter families, placing humans and models in a shared low-dimensional cognitive space. The resulting fits show how reasoning shifts models toward human-like regimes of evidence accumulation and belief-to-choice mapping, and yield testable predictions about the latent dynamics that might drive each decision. Probing residual-stream activations of an open-weight reasoning model, we find that the geometry of internal representations tracks these predicted dynamics, linking behavior to representational correlates of the fitted latent dynamics.