Chain-of-Sanitized-Thoughts: Reducing PII Leakage in Chain-of-Thought Reasoning
Abstract
Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) are increasingly deployed as components of LLM agents that perform multi-step interactions and maintain an intermediate state. While its chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning improves performance, it introduces a privacy risk: intermediate reasoning traces can expose personally identifiable information (PII) even when final answers are sanitized. In agent settings, these traces may be logged or propagated across components, creating a persistent attack surface. We study whether models can be induced to reason privately, rather than relying on post-hoc redaction. We introduce Chain-of-Sanitized-Thoughts, a privacy-first intervention that teaches LRMs to “think privately”. To do so, we also introduce PII-CoT-Bench, a supervised dataset and evaluation benchmark for privacy-aware reasoning under realistic and adversarial leakage scenarios. Our results reveal a capability-dependent pattern: stronger instruction-following models can suppress leakage through prompting alone, while weaker models require parameter updates to reliably avoid disclosure. Despite substantial reductions in leakage, utility remains largely preserved, indicating that privacy-preserving reasoning need not degrade task performance. These findings suggest that privacy-preserving reasoning can be improved at the model level, providing a practical path toward safer deployment of LLM agents.