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Beyond $log^2(T)$ regret for decentralized bandits in matching markets

Soumya Basu, Karthik Abinav Sankararaman, Abishek Sankararaman

[ Abstract ] [ Livestream: Visit Bandits 4 ] [ Paper ]

We design decentralized algorithms for regret minimization in the two sided matching market with one-sided bandit feedback that significantly improves upon the prior works (Liu et al.\,2020a, Sankararaman et al.\,2020, Liu et al.\,2020b). First, for general markets, for any $\varepsilon > 0$, we design an algorithm that achieves a $O(\log^{1+\varepsilon}(T))$ regret to the agent-optimal stable matching, with unknown time horizon $T$, improving upon the $O(\log^{2}(T))$ regret achieved in (Liu et al.\,2020b). Second, we provide the optimal $\Theta(\log(T))$ agent-optimal regret for markets satisfying {\em uniqueness consistency} -- markets where leaving participants don't alter the original stable matching. Previously, $\Theta(\log(T))$ regret was achievable (Sankararaman et al.\,2020, Liu et al.\,2020b) in the much restricted {\em serial dictatorship} setting, when all arms have the same preference over the agents. We propose a phase based algorithm, where in each phase, besides deleting the globally communicated dominated arms the agents locally delete arms with which they collide often. This \emph{local deletion} is pivotal in breaking deadlocks arising from rank heterogeneity of agents across arms. We further demonstrate superiority of our algorithm over existing works through simulations.

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