Moderator: Chicheng Zhang

Abstract:

Wed 21 July 17:00 - 17:20 PDT

(Oral)

CHUNXUE YANG · Xiaohui Bei

In single-item auction design, it is well known due to Cremer and McLean that when bidders’ valuations are drawn from a correlated prior distribution, the auctioneer can extract full social surplus as revenue. However, in most real-world applications, the prior is usually unknown and can only be learned from historical data. In this work, we investigate the robustness of the optimal auction with correlated valuations via sample complexity analysis. We prove upper and lower bounds on the number of samples from the unknown prior required to learn a (1-epsilon)-approximately optimal auction. Our results reinforce the common belief that optimal correlated auctions are sensitive to the distribution parameters and hard to learn unless the prior distribution is well-behaved.

Wed 21 July 17:20 - 17:25 PDT

(Spotlight)

Meena Jagadeesan · Celestine Mendler-Dünner · Moritz Hardt

When reasoning about strategic behavior in a machine learning context it is tempting to combine standard microfoundations of rational agents with the statistical decision theory underlying classification. In this work, we argue that a direct combination of these ingredients leads to brittle solution concepts of limited descriptive and prescriptive value. First, we show that rational agents with perfect information produce discontinuities in the aggregate response to a decision rule that we often do not observe empirically. Second, when any positive fraction of agents is not perfectly strategic, desirable stable points---where the classifier is optimal for the data it entails---no longer exist. Third, optimal decision rules under standard microfoundations maximize a measure of negative externality known as social burden within a broad class of assumptions about agent behavior. Recognizing these limitations we explore alternatives to standard microfoundations for binary classification. We describe desiderata that help navigate the space of possible assumptions about agent responses, and we then propose the noisy response model. Inspired by smoothed analysis and empirical observations, noisy response incorporates imperfection in the agent responses, which we show mitigates the limitations of standard microfoundations. Our model retains analytical tractability, leads to more robust insights about stable points, and imposes a lower social burden at optimality.

Wed 21 July 17:25 - 17:30 PDT

(Spotlight)

Matteo Castiglioni · Alberto Marchesi · Andrea Celli · Nicola Gatti

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should partially disclose information to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. Classical models make the stringent assumption that the sender knows the receiver’s utility. This can be relaxed by considering an online learning framework in which the sender repeatedly faces a receiver of an unknown, adversarially selected type. We study, for the first time, an online Bayesian persuasion setting with multiple receivers. We focus on the case with no externalities and binary actions, as customary in offline models. Our goal is to design no-regret algorithms for the sender with polynomial per-iteration running time. First, we prove a negative result: for any 0 < α ≤ 1, there is no polynomial-time no-α-regret algorithm when the sender’s utility function is supermodular or anonymous. Then, we focus on the setting of submodular sender’s utility functions and we show that, in this case, it is possible to design a polynomial-time no-(1-1/e)-regret algorithm. To do so, we introduce a general online gradient descent framework to handle online learning problems with a finite number of possible loss functions. This requires the existence of an approximate projection oracle. We show that, in our setting, there exists one such projection oracle which can be implemented in polynomial time.

Wed 21 July 17:30 - 17:35 PDT

(Spotlight)

Ilai Bistritz · Nicholas Bambos

Consider N players that each uses a mixture of K resources. Each of the players' reward functions includes a linear pricing term for each resource that is controlled by the game manager. We assume that the game is strongly monotone, so if each player runs gradient descent, the dynamics converge to a unique Nash equilibrium (NE). Unfortunately, this NE can be inefficient since the total load on a given resource can be very high. In principle, we can control the total loads by tuning the coefficients of the pricing terms. However, finding pricing coefficients that balance the loads requires knowing the players' reward functions and their action sets. Obtaining this game structure information is infeasible in a large-scale network and violates the users' privacy. To overcome this, we propose a simple algorithm that learns to shift the NE of the game to meet the total load constraints by adjusting the pricing coefficients in an online manner. Our algorithm only requires the total load per resource as feedback and does not need to know the reward functions or the action sets. We prove that our algorithm guarantees convergence in L2 to a NE that meets target total load constraints. Simulations show the effectiveness of our approach when applied to smart grid demand-side management or power control in wireless networks.

Wed 21 July 17:35 - 17:40 PDT

(Spotlight)

Yi Hao · Alon Orlitsky

Maximum likelihood (ML) is one of the most fundamental and general statistical estimation techniques. Inspired by recent advances in estimating distribution functionals, we propose $\textit{compressed maximum likelihood}$ (CML) that applies ML to the compressed samples. We then show that CML is sample-efficient for several essential learning tasks over both discrete and continuous domains, including learning densities with structures, estimating probability multisets, and inferring symmetric distribution functionals.

Wed 21 July 17:40 - 17:45 PDT

(Spotlight)

Tommaso d'Orsi · Gleb Novikov · David Steurer

We consider a robust linear regression model $y=X\beta^* + \eta$, where an adversary oblivious to the design $X\in \mathbb{R}^{n\times d}$ may choose $\eta$ to corrupt all but an $\alpha$ fraction of the observations $y$ in an arbitrary way. Prior to our work, even for Gaussian $X$, no estimator for $\beta^*$ was known to be consistent in this model except for quadratic sample size $n \gtrsim (d/\alpha)^2$ or for logarithmic inlier fraction $\alpha\ge 1/\log n$. We show that consistent estimation is possible with nearly linear sample size and inverse-polynomial inlier fraction. Concretely, we show that the Huber loss estimator is consistent for every sample size $n= \omega(d/\alpha^2)$ and achieves an error rate of $O(d/\alpha^2n)^{1/2}$ (both bounds are optimal up to constant factors). Our results extend to designs far beyond the Gaussian case and only require the column span of $X$ to not contain approximately sparse vectors (similar to the kind of assumption commonly made about the kernel space for compressed sensing). We provide two technically similar proofs. One proof is phrased in terms of strong convexity, extending work of [Tsakonas et al. '14], and particularly short. The other proof highlights a connection between the Huber loss estimator and high-dimensional median computations. In the special case of Gaussian designs, this connection leads us to a strikingly simple algorithm based on computing coordinate-wise medians that achieves nearly optimal guarantees in linear time, and that can exploit sparsity of $\beta^*$. The model studied here also captures heavy-tailed noise distributions that may not even have a first moment.

Wed 21 July 17:45 - 17:50 PDT

(Spotlight)

Mojtaba Sahraee-Ardakan · Tung Mai · Anup Rao · Ryan A. Rossi · Sundeep Rangan · Alyson Fletcher

Understanding generalization and estimation error of estimators for simple models such as linear and generalized linear models has attracted a lot of attention recently. This is in part due to an interesting observation made in machine learning community that highly over-parameterized neural networks achieve zero training error, and yet they are able to generalize well over the test samples. This phenomenon is captured by the so called double descent curve, where the generalization error starts decreasing again after the interpolation threshold. A series of recent works tried to explain such phenomenon for simple models. In this work, we analyze the asymptotics of estimation error in ridge estimators for convolutional linear models. These convolutional inverse problems, also known as deconvolution, naturally arise in different fields such as seismology, imaging, and acoustics among others. Our results hold for a large class of input distributions that include i.i.d. features as a special case. We derive exact formulae for estimation error of ridge estimators that hold in a certain high-dimensional regime. We show the double descent phenomenon in our experiments for convolutional models and show that our theoretical results match the experiments.