Large language models offer a tempting solution to address the peer review crisis. This position paper argues that today's AI systems should not be used to produce paper reviews. We ground this positing in an empirical comparison of human- versus AI-generated ICLR 2026 reviews and an evaluation of the effect of automated paper rewriting on different AI reviewers. We identify two critical issues: 1) AI reviewers exhibit a hivemind effect of excessive agreement within and across papers that reduces perspective diversity. 2) AI review scores are trivially gameable through paper laundering: prompting an LLM to rewrite a paper could significantly increase the scores from AI reviewers, demonstrating that LLM reviewers are easy to game through stylistic changes rather than scientific results. However, non-gameability and review diversity are necessary but not sufficient conditions for automation. We argue that addressing the peer review crisis requires a science of peer review automation---not general-purpose LLMs deployed without rigorous evaluation.

Peer review, the bedrock of scientific advancement in machine learning (ML), is strained by a crisis of scale. Exponential growth in manuscript submissions to premier ML venues such as NeurIPS, ICML, and ICLR is outpacing the finite capacity of qualified reviewers, leading to concerns about review quality, consistency, and reviewer fatigue. This position paper argues that AI-assisted peer review must become an urgent research and infrastructure priority. We advocate for a comprehensive AI-augmented ecosystem, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) not as replacements for human judgment, but as sophisticated collaborators for authors, reviewers, and Area Chairs (ACs). We propose specific roles for AI in enhancing factual verification, guiding reviewer performance, assisting authors in quality improvement, and supporting ACs in decision-making. Crucially, we contend that the development of such systems hinges on access to more granular, structured, and ethically-sourced peer review process data. We outline a research agenda, including illustrative experiments, to develop and validate these AI assistants, and discuss significant technical and ethical challenges. We call upon the ML community to proactively build this AI-assisted future, ensuring the continued integrity and scalability of scientific validation, while maintaining high standards of peer review.

Collaborative machine learning involves training high-quality models using datasets from a number of sources. To incentivize sources to share data, existing data valuation methods fairly reward each source based on its data submitted as is. However, as these methods do not verify nor incentivize data truthfulness, the sources can manipulate their data (e.g., by submitting duplicated or noisy data) to artificially increase their valuations and rewards or prevent others from benefiting. This paper presents the first mechanism that provably ensures (F) collaborative fairness and incentivizes (T) truthfulness at equilibrium for Bayesian models. Our mechanism combines semivalues (e.g., Shapley value), which ensure fairness, and a truthful data valuation function (DVF) based on a validation set that is unknown to the sources. As semivalues are influenced by others' data, we introduce an additional condition to prove that a source can maximize its expected data values in coalitions and semivalues by submitting a dataset that captures its true knowledge. Additionally, we discuss the implications and suitable relaxations of (F) and (T) when the mediator has a limited budget for rewards or lacks a validation set. Our theoretical findings are validated on synthetic and real-world datasets.

State-of-the-art large language models require specialized hardware and substantial energy to operate. Consequently, cloud-based services that provide access to these models have become very popular. In these services, the price users pay depends on the number of tokens a model uses to generate an output–they pay a fixed price per token. In this work, we show that this pricing mechanism creates a financial incentive for providers to strategize and misreport the (number of) tokens a model used to generate an output, and users cannot prove, or even know, whether a provider is overcharging them. However, we also show that, if an unfaithful provider is obliged to be transparent about the generative process used by the model, misreporting optimally without raising suspicion is hard. Nevertheless, as a proof-of-concept, we develop an efficient heuristic algorithm that allows providers to significantly overcharge users without raising suspicion. Crucially, the cost of running the algorithm is lower than the additional revenue from overcharging users, highlighting the vulnerability of users under the current pay-per-token pricing mechanism. Further, we show that, to eliminate the financial incentive to strategize, a pricing mechanism must price tokens linearly on their character count. While this makes a provider's profit margin vary across tokens, we introduce a simple prescription that allows a provider to maintain their average profit margin when transitioning to an incentive-compatible pricing mechanism. To complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with large language models from the $\texttt{Llama}$, $\texttt{Gemma}$ and $\texttt{Ministral}$ families, and prompts from a popular benchmarking platform.