We argue that many Anthropomorphized Misalignment Research (AMR) studies need stronger evidence to ensure that they can provide a robust foundation for critical safety decisions, such as model deployment and regulation. By evaluating failure modes across different misalignment concepts, such as deception, emergent misalignment, and sycophancy, we show how conceptual ambiguity, non-robust datasets and experimental design, and insufficient causal interventions can lead to overinterpretation of model behaviors. This position paper aims to offer guidance on evidentiary considerations that can help improve methodological rigor in AMR. To achieve this, we provide a clear call to action through a proposed framework of evidence levels and a diagnostic checklist. These shared standards will enable more productive scientific discourse and ensure that claims about AI risks rest on solid empirical foundations.

Safe deployment of increasingly capable AI agents may require visibility into how they make decisions. Chain-of-thought (CoT) monitoring can detect misbehavior in today’s reasoning models, but this “monitorability” may be fragile under different training procedures, data sources, or continued system scaling. We propose three evaluation archetypes (intervention, process, and outcome-property), a new monitorability metric, and a broad evaluation suite. We show CoT monitoring outperforms action-only monitoring in practical settings, and that frontier models are generally—but not perfectly—monitorable. We study scaling trends with pre-training model size and inference-time compute, finding longer CoTs are typically more monitorable. We find that, for a fixed capability level, using a smaller model at higher reasoning effort can yield higher monitorability, at greater inference compute cost. We further find that increasing a weak monitor’s test-time compute when monitoring a strong agent improves monitorability, and giving the monitor access to the CoT both boosts monitorability and steepens the compute–to-monitorability scaling trend. Finally, we show monitorability can be improved by asking follow-up questions and giving the follow-up CoT to the monitor.

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The detector penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

Aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with the diverse spectrum of human values remains a central challenge: preference-based methods often fail to capture deeper motivational principles. Value-based approaches offer a more principled path, yet three gaps persist: extraction often ignores hierarchical structure, evaluation detects presence but not calibrated intensity, and steerability of LLMs at controlled intensities remains insufficiently understood. To address these limitations, we introduce VALUEFLOW, a unified framework that spans extraction, evaluation, and steering with calibrated intensity control. The framework integrates three components: (i) HiVES, a hierarchical value embedding space that captures intra- and cross-theory value structure; (ii) the Value Intensity DataBase (VIDB), a large-scale resource of value-labeled texts with intensity estimates derived from ranking-based aggregation; and (iii) an anchor-based evaluator that produces consistent intensity scores for model outputs by ranking them against VIDB panels. Using VALUEFLOW, we conduct a comprehensive large-scale study across ten models and four value theories, identifying asymmetries in steerability and composition laws for multi-value control. This paper establishes a scalable infrastructure for evaluating and controlling value intensity, advancing pluralistic alignment of LLMs.