This paper proposes asymmetric perturbation, where only one player's payoff function is perturbed, for solving bilinear saddle-point optimization problems, commonly arising in minimax problems, game theory, and constrained optimization. Symmetric perturbation is known to require decreasing its strength to ensure convergence to a solution, i.e., an equilibrium in the original game, resulting in a slower rate. First, with asymmetric perturbation, we show that, for a sufficiently small perturbation strength, the equilibrium strategy of the asymmetrically perturbed game coincides with an equilibrium strategy of the original unperturbed game. Second, building on this coincidence, we construct a learning algorithm with a linear last-iterate convergence rate. Third, motivated by the fact that the coincidence relies on the perturbation strength being sufficiently small, we also provide a parameter-free variant, retaining the linear rate. Finally, we empirically demonstrate fast convergence toward equilibria in both normal-form and extensive-form games.

Mixture models, such as Gaussian mixture models (GMMs), are widely used in machine learning to represent complex data distributions. A key challenge, especially in high-dimensional settings, is to determine the mixture order and estimate the mixture parameters. We study the problem of approximating a target measure, available only through finitely many of its moments, by a mixture of distributions from a parametric family (e.g., Gaussian, exponential, Poisson), with approximation quality measured by the 2-Wasserstein ($\operatorname{W_2}$) or the total variation ($\operatorname{TV}$) distance. Unlike many existing approaches, the parameter set is not assumed to be finite; it is modeled as a compact basic semi-algebraic set. We introduce a hierarchy of semidefinite relaxations with asymptotic convergence to the desired optimal value. In addition, when a certain rank condition is satisfied, the convergence is even finite and recovery of an optimal mixing measure is obtained. We also present an application to clustering, where our framework serves either as a stand-alone method or as a preprocessing step that yields both the number of clusters and strong initial parameter estimates, thereby accelerating convergence of standard (local) clustering algorithms

The low-rank adaptation (LoRA) algorithm for fine-tuning large models has grown popular in recent years due to its remarkable performance and low computational requirements. LoRA trains two "adapter" matrices that form a low-rank representation of the model parameters, thereby massively reducing the number of parameters that need to be updated at every step. Although LoRA is simple, its convergence is poorly understood due to the lack of Lipschitz smoothness, a key condition for classic convergence analyses. As a result, current theoretical results only consider asymptotic behavior or assume strong boundedness conditions which artificially enforce Lipschitz smoothness. In this work, we provide for the first time a non-asymptotic convergence analysis of the *original LoRA gradient descent* algorithm, which reflects widespread practice, without such assumptions. Our work relies on three key steps: i) reformulating the problem in terms of the outer product of the stacked adapter matrices, ii) a modified descent lemma for the "Lipschitz-like" reparametrized function, and iii) controlling the step size. With this approach, we prove that LoRA gradient descent converges to a stationary point at rate $O(\frac{1}{\log T})$, where $T$ is the number of iterations.

We study the revenue of approximate correlated equilibrium in discrete first price auctions - the set of allowable bids is $\mathcal{B} = \{0, 1/k, \dots, 1 - 1/k, 1\}$ for some $k \in \mathbb{N}$. We show that the revenue of any $\epsilon$-\textit{approximate} correlated equilibrium is at least $v_2 - \Theta(1/k)- \Theta(\epsilon k^2)$, where $v_2 \geq 0$ is the second-highest valuation. Our results establish the first polynomial convergence rates on the revenue generated by no-swap regret bidders in first-price auctions. For instance, if bidders admit the optimal swap regret of $\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{k T})$, then the time-averaged revenue is at least $v_2 - \Theta(1/k) - \Theta(\epsilon)$ after $\mathcal{O}(k^5/\epsilon^2)$ rounds.