Position: AI Welfare Is Bullshit

In this position paper, we argue that for AI systems, ``welfare'' is a choice in mechanism and evaluation, rather than an empirically discoverable property, because welfare assessment lacks an external validation channel: there is no independent, intervention-based test that can falsify a welfare metric or adjudicate among competing accounts of what welfare requires. We formalize this diagnosis using evaluation theory, emphasizing that in AI the subject, indicators, and metrics are co-engineered, so proposed welfare evidence can be manufactured or suppressed by ordinary development decisions. We then analyze two institutional failure modes if welfare scorecards are nonetheless used in release and access decisions: they expand procedural gates around routine ML work and they enable organizations to reframe discretionary choices about liability, publicity, and risk posture as moral necessity. We conclude with guidance for research and governance: prohibit welfare scorecards as release gates, disallow appeals to model welfare as a reason to resist auditing and oversight, and require that any restrictions on AI development be justified by externally verifiable harms rather than untestable welfare claims.