INDEXGUARD: Index-only Backdoor Vetting for Secure Federated PEFT of Large Language Models
Abstract
Lay Summary
Many organizations want to adapt large language models to their own private data, but sharing this data or exposing each participant’s model updates can create privacy risks. At the same time, malicious or compromised participants may try to secretly insert a “backdoor,” causing the model to behave normally most of the time but produce attacker-chosen outputs when a hidden trigger appears. This paper introduces IndexGuard, a lightweight way to check for such poisoned participants before their updates are combined into the shared model. Instead of inspecting full model updates, clients only report which parts of their small fine-tuning update changed the most. IndexGuard compares these compact reports across clients and filters groups that look suspicious. Experiments show that this approach can detect backdoored clients across different attacks, tasks, models, and fine-tuning methods while preserving normal model accuracy and remaining compatible with privacy-preserving federated learning.