From Prompts to Responses: Dual-Sided Data Leakage and Defense in Split Large Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in privacy-sensitive domains, where users must balance the risk of data exposure through external APIs against the high computational cost of local deployment. Split learning has therefore emerged as a promising paradigm for LLM fine-tuning and inference under limited local resources. However, it introduces new privacy risks. Prior work primarily studies leakage of private input prompts, typically via inversion attacks on intermediate representations, while the potential for sensitive information leakage through generative response outputs remains largely unexplored. In this work, we unveil novel vulnerabilities of Split-LLM by presentingPatched Model Inversion with Dual-Sided Initialization(PIDI), a two-stage attack that simultaneously targets both private input prompts and output responses in Split-LLM settings. It combines dual-sided initialization with a patched inversion strategy to tackle long sequences, substantially outperforming prior inversion methods. To counter threats from both sides, we further propose the Adapter-based DualGuard with Mutual Information Defense(ADMI), which integrates an adapter-based local warmup strategy and mutual information regularization to provide a strong privacy guarantee with minimal impact on task performance. Extensive experiments across diverse tasks and models demonstrate that ADMI effectively defends against PIDI and other state-of-the-art inversion attacks. Our code is publicly available at https://anonymous.4open.science/r/DDRA/.