In everyday learning and reasoning, people routinely draw
successful generalizations from very limited evidence. Even young
children can infer the meanings of words, hidden properties of
objects, or the existence of causal relations from just one or a few
relevant observations -- far outstripping the capabilities of
conventional learning machines. How do they do it? And how can we
bring machines closer to these human-like learning abilities? I will
argue that people's everyday inductive leaps can be understood as
approximations to Bayesian computations operating over structured
representations of the world, what cognitive scientists have called
"intuitive theories" or "schemas". For each of several everyday
learning tasks, I will consider how appropriate knowledge
representations are structured and used, and how these representations
could themselves be learned via Bayesian methods. The key challenge
is to balance the need for strongly constrained inductive biases --
critical for generalization from very few examples -- with the
flexibility to learn about the structure of new domains, to learn
new inductive biases suitable for environments which we could not have
been pre-programmed to perform in. The models I discuss will connect
to several directions in contemporary machine learning, such as
semi-supervised learning, structure learning in graphical models,
hierarchical Bayesian modeling, and nonparametric Bayes.