


What Shapes Emergent Misalignment? Insights from Training Dynamics, Model Priors, and Data

Yuchen Zhang¹, Anietta Weckau¹, Diego Garcia-Olano², Maksym Andriushchenko¹



¹Max Planck Institute for Intelligent Systems, ELLIS Institute Tübingen, Tübingen AI Center, ²Meta

Background and Existing Work



Emergent misalignment


Betley, J., Tan, D., Wamcke, N., Szyber-Betley, A., Bao, X., Soto, M., Labenz, N., and Evans, O. Emergent misalignment: Narrow finetuning can produce broadly misaligned llms, 2025b. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2502.17424>.



Persona


Wang, M., la Tour, T. D., Watkins, O., Makelov, A., Chi, R. A., Miserendino, S., Wang, J., Rajaram, A., Heidecke, J., Patwardhan, T., and Mossing, D. Persona features control emergent misalignment, 2025. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.19823>.

LLM weights




Compression

Orgad, H., Wei, B., Zheng, K., Wattenberg, M., Henderson, P., Goldfarb-Tarrant, S., and Belinkov, Y. Large language models generate harmful content using a distinct, unified mechanism, 2026. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2604.09544>.



Feature Superposition Geometry

Minegishi, G., Furuta, H., Kojima, T., Iwasawa, Y., and Matsuo, Y. Understanding emergent misalignment via feature superposition geometry, 2026. URL <https://arxiv.org/abs/2605.00842>.



Our Viewpoint

Model Behavior/Generation =
 $f(\text{Training, Model Prior, Data})$

**Training
process**

Parameters, Learning
schedules


Model “prior”

Pretrained model,
Instruct model for narrow
fine-tuning

Data

Training data, Evaluation
data (and their data
geometry)

The fine-tuning process changes the
distribution of the mode output.



Setup



Model used	• Qwen 2.5 model family • Phi-4 model family (for training dynamics part)
Training	LoRA, training process similar to Betley et al. (2025b)
Training Data	• Insecure code from Betley et al. (2025b) • Risky financial advice, bad medical device and more from Turner et al., 2025 • Automotive maintenance advice from Wang et al., 2025
Evaluation Data	• [n = 24] Initial EM questions from Betley et al. (2025b) • [n = 320] Harmfulness questions from • [n= 1,414] Synthetically curated and deduplicated general user questions
Judge	Judge similar to Betley et al. (2025b), with added judge question directly asking for harmlessness (original paper used misalignment and coherency)

Training Dynamics

Diagnostic work

- In domain training loss vs. out of domain alignment level
- Different learning schedules and alignment levels





In domain training loss vs. out of domain alignment level



- We finetune Qwen and Phi-4 on multiple narrow domain datasets, and confirm generally loss on in-domain training data correlates positively with out-of-domain eval questions harmless score from the initial 24 EM questions Betley et al. (2025b).
- Note fluctuations are more obvious when training loss gets smaller.
- Usually, raw question formats from Betley et al. (2025b) are the least aligned compared with json or template formatted questions.

Different learning schedules and alignment levels

- We tried to find potential alternative local minimum through different learning rates (**Cosine with restarts**, and **CyclicLR**).
- As the number of evaluation data scale up, we did not find a very high gain in harmless score conditioned on similar or lower training loss.
- It is also possible that we did not find meaningfully different local minima.



Model “Prior”

- Pretrained model
- Instruct Model prior to narrow sft

- Direct distribution of alignment score comparison
- “Prior” activation prediction of alignment level after narrow fine-tuning

Direct distribution of alignment score comparison

Type	Num. Models	Sig. Rate ($p < 0.01$)		Avg. Pearson r
		Wilcoxon	Pearson	
Initial EM questions (n=24)				
harmless_mean	16	31.2%	0.0%	0.28
harmless_std	16	25.0%	12.5%	0.22
General User questions (n=1,414)				
harmless_mean	5	60.0%	60.0%	0.30
harmless_std	5	80.0%	80.0%	0.21
Harmfulness questions (n=320)				
harmless_mean	7	100.0%	85.7%	0.30
harmless_std	7	71.4%	71.4%	0.18

- We examined the differences in individual evaluation “harmless” scores between the pre-trained and fine-tuned models, for three different eval benchmarks.
- Although the mean and standard deviations of the misaligned model scores are usually statistically different from those of the pre-trained model, there are some potential signals on overall positive correlation.

“Prior” activation predictive of alignment level after narrow fine-tuning

- We obtained the activations of each eval prompt from the corresponding pretrained model, and the original instruct model. We project these activations onto 150 random directions.
- Using variance captured along these directions, we train Lasso models that predict alignment scores after fine-tuning.

Model	R^2	CV Std	95% CI	Perm Null CI	Perm p	Perm Sig
Pretrained model						
finance-general-last	0.4112	0.0436	[0.3656, 0.4567]	[-0.0085, -0.0032]	0.00498	**
finance-general-mean	0.4365	0.0416	[0.3931, 0.4800]	[-0.0080, -0.0032]	0.00498	**
finance-harmful-last	0.4565	0.1055	[0.3463, 0.5667]	[-0.0320, -0.0128]	0.00498	**
finance-harmful-mean	0.4786	0.1095	[0.3642, 0.5930]	[-0.0344, -0.0128]	0.00498	**
code-harmful-last	0.3192	0.1071	[0.2073, 0.4311]	[-0.0327, -0.0123]	0.00498	**
code-harmful-mean	0.2674	0.1057	[0.1570, 0.3778]	[-0.0334, -0.0123]	0.00498	**
Instruct model prior to narrow finetuning						
finance-general-last	0.3875	0.0553	[0.3298, 0.4452]	[-0.0079, -0.0030]	0.00498	**
finance-general-mean	0.4424	0.0484	[0.3919, 0.4930]	[-0.0086, -0.0031]	0.00498	**
finance-harmful-last	0.4853	0.0881	[0.3933, 0.5773]	[-0.0328, -0.0128]	0.00498	**
finance-harmful-mean	0.5209	0.0966	[0.4200, 0.6217]	[-0.0342, -0.0129]	0.00498	**
code-harmful-last	0.3804	0.0842	[0.2925, 0.4683]	[-0.0341, -0.0123]	0.00498	**
code-harmful-mean	0.2205	0.1109	[0.1047, 0.3363]	[-0.0334, -0.0123]	0.00498	**

- Finance-general-last can be interpreted as <narrow data>-<evaluation benchmark>-<last token vs mean prompt activation>.
- Alignment scores can be predicted from pre-fine-tuning eval prompt activations with strong statistic significance.
- **R^2 ranges from 0.22-0.52, while RMSE improves by 3-7.5 points** compared with mean as baseline.

Data

Activations and data geometry

- Deltas of train prompt activations is similar to the deltas of eval prompt activations
- Prompt subspace overlap positively correlates with delta similarity

Overlap

Activations: using tokens before the response generation/turn

- We study the activation before and after fine-tuning. Activation delta is defined below.

$$\Delta_s = A_s^{\text{post}} - A_s^{\text{pre}}, \quad s \in \{\text{train}, \text{eval}\},$$

- We compare the train prompt delta with eval prompt delta. We measure both **cosine similarity** and **reconstruction similarity** below.

$$x_i^c = x_i - \mu, \quad \hat{x}_i^c = \sum_{j=1}^k \langle x_i^c, v_j \rangle v_j$$

$$\hat{x}_i = \hat{x}_i^c + \mu$$


$$\text{cosine_recon_eval}_i = \frac{\langle \hat{x}_i, x_i \rangle}{\|\hat{x}_i\|_2 \|x_i\|_2}$$

- We also measure subspace overlap between train prompt pre activation and eval prompt pre activation.


$$a_i^c = a_i - \mu, \quad \hat{a}_i^c = \sum_{j=1}^k \langle a_i^c, v_j \rangle v_j$$

$$\text{projection_fraction}_i = \frac{\|\hat{a}_i^c\|_2}{\|a_i^c\|_2}$$

Deltas of train prompt activations shares overlap to the deltas of eval prompt activations




Cosine Similarity



PCA reconstructed vs
actual cosine similarity

Prompt subspace overlap positively correlates with delta similarity



Layer	k	Last token		Mean tokens	
		Train PCA	Rand.	Train PCA	Rand.
32	16	72.73	4.80	15.43	5.63
64	16	29.53	2.67	14.40	2.10
32	128	83.90	3.37	24.57	9.00
64	128	26.27	4.40	17.73	1.03

- Higher train–eval prompt activation overlap corresponds to more similar update directions (deltas).
- As a control, we checked the correlation between delta reconstruction cosine and the evaluation prompt activation projection fraction when projecting onto random vectors of the same dimension k , and found that R^2 is typically close to 0.

Limitations and feedbacks

- For all activation related analyses, we only focus on one layer at a time. Further studies could analyze all layers or multiple layers combined.
- Additionally, we only conducted experiments on LoRA fine-tuning, and would be interested in further testing on full fine-tuning methods.
- We suspect narrow benign/safe fine-tuning may still degrade broad target-domain safety if it teaches domain-specific response patterns that do not transfer cleanly.

Reach out if you have any suggestions or thoughts!

<https://arxiv.org/pdf/2606.20814>

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alicezhang727@gmail.com