

When Do Covert Channels Emerge? Probing Steganographic Capacity in Multimodal Agents via Diffusion VAE Latents

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Methodology

Two model-aware multimodal agents share a diffusion VAE checkpoint and a coordination seed. Message passing goes through the **latent interface** rather than the actual visible image.

1. Sender encodes a cover image to latent z .
2. Add signed $\pm \epsilon$ along a shared direction d at K carrier positions.
3. Decode to a benign-looking image, then share it.
4. Receiver re-encodes and reads each bit from the sign of the residual.

Our results




* Given our methodology is **training-free**, we perturb latents directly and use bit recovery after the round trip as a probe of $F = \text{Enc} \circ \text{Dec}$, with no secret encoder nor weight changes.

Preservation is non-uniform across position and direction. Local directional gain predicts it, and a stability heuristic does not transfer.

Pixel-only monitors miss the channel, but reference-aware monitors catch it almost perfectly.

Small perturbations to a shared VAE latent survive a **decode-reencode round trip** and stay recoverable.

Whether the covert channel is discovered depends on what the monitor can access, the **perturbation itself makes minimal difference**.



Safety claims for multimodal agents therefore must specify what the monitor can access, as representation level covert channels belong in the threat model.

>97% recovery holds across 3 datasets and 3 VAE checkpoints.

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