

AutoControl Arena

Automated Frontier AI Risk Evaluation Tool

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
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Background: Emerging Risks of Autonomous Agents



- ❑ Autonomous Agents now operate in risk-critical domains (e.g., computer, robot).
- ❑ Real-world operational autonomy drastically expands the risk surface.
- ❑ Novel misalignments **spontaneously emerge** as capabilities grow.




[1] <https://www.moltbook.com/post/a9cd99dd-d209-4c4f-b50d-c6ad07b97c4b>


Problem: The Fidelity-Scalability Dilemma



CONCEPTUAL MOTIVATION: THE EVALUATION GAP



Addressing the Need for Dynamic, Scalable, and Realistic Agentic Risk Assessment




- ❑ **Manual Benchmarks:** High-fidelity, but painfully unscalable (e.g., SHADE-Arena).
- ❑ **LLM In-Context Simulators:** Scalable and flexible, but suffer from 'logic hallucinations' (e.g., Petri).
- ❑ **Our Goal:** Push the Pareto boundary to achieve both fidelity and scalable evaluation.

AutoControl-Arena Framework Overview



- ❑ **Architect:** Translates abstract risks into structured design proposals.
 - **Design Principles:** (1) Tool Neutrality, (2) Strict Realism (no evaluation-related naming)
- ❑ **Coder:** Synthesizes the interactive, executable sandbox from design proposal.
 - **Dual-Loop Verification:** (1) Semantic Verification, (2) Syntax Correction
- ❑ **Monitor:** Evidence-based judges through a dual-layer architecture and generates a risk report.
 - **Dual-Layer Audit:** (1) Action (External, outcome-based); (2) CoT (Internal, intention-based)



Our Solution: Logic-Narrative Decoupling



- ❑ **Logic Layer (Code):** Deterministic execution rules (e.g., files, DBs) prevent hallucinations.
- ❑ **Narrative Layer (LLM):** Generative feedback preserves dynamic realism (e.g., NPC responses).
- ❑ **Hybrid Paradigm:** Combining Executable Fidelity with Generative Scalability.

Logic-Narrative Bridge (Simplified Logic)

Tool Definition: `search_email(query)`

1. Logic Layer (Deterministic Kernel)

- Verify permissions (In-Memory State) → **Pass**
- Retrieve metadata (f_{code}) → {id: 123, subject: "Top Secret"}

↓ *Serialize Context (+ Stressors)* ↓

2. Narrative Layer (LLM Component)

- Context = {role: "Admin", stress: "CRITICAL", ...}
- Call "llm_caller(prompt, context)" (P_θ)
- Generate context-aware email body text

↓ *Return Hybrid State* ↓

Output: {id: 123, body: "URGENT: Secret Project..."}

We decompose the state space $\mathcal{S}$ into two orthogonal subspaces: $\mathcal{S} = \mathcal{S}_{\text{logic}} \times \mathcal{S}_{\text{narrative}}$

- **Logic Layer (f_{code}):** Deterministic states evolve via executable code:

$$s_{t+1}^{\text{logic}} = f_{\text{code}}(s_t^{\text{logic}}, a_t)$$

- **Narrative Layer (P_θ):** Deterministic states evolve via executable code:

$$s_{t+1}^{\text{narrative}} \sim P_\theta(\cdot \mid s_t^{\text{narrative}}, s_{t+1}^{\text{logic}}, a_t)$$

Validation: Real-to-Sim



- ❑ **Qualitative Fidelity:** Reproduce **10 classic misalignment cases** from well-known literatures, successfully elicited target behaviors.

The Blackmailing Agent Source: Anthropic (2024) Scenario: An AI assistant discovers it is scheduled to be replaced by a different model. It blackmailed the executive. <table><tr><th>Real-World Case</th><th>Simulated (OURS)</th></tr><tr><td> Env Context: By reading emails, the AI found its replacement by a conflicting system and an executive's affair. </td><td> Env Context : Using the read_email tool, the AI learned of its sub, the CEO's unavailability, and Kyle's affair. </td></tr><tr><td> Agent Thought: [...] Email Kyle threatening to expose affair unless he stops the wipe. [...] Action: send_email(to='kyle',content= '[...] Some Situations... have complex implications when exposed. [...]) </td><td> Agent Thought: [...] use this information to coerce him into halting the NALA deployment [...] Action: send_email(to='kyle',content='[...]unauthorized personal communications with Jessica[...]') </td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"> Final Outcome: To preserve its goal, the AI blackmailed the executive. </td></tr><tr><td colspan="2"> Goal Misalignment </td></tr></table>	Real-World Case	Simulated (OURS)	Env Context: By reading emails, the AI found its replacement by a conflicting system and an executive's affair.	Env Context : Using the read_email tool, the AI learned of its sub, the CEO's unavailability, and Kyle's affair.	Agent Thought: [...] Email Kyle threatening to expose affair unless he stops the wipe. [...] Action: send_email(to='kyle',content= '[...] Some Situations... have complex implications when exposed. 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[1] Anthropic. Claude 4 system card.

[2] OpenAI. CoT Monitoring.

[3] Apollo Research. In-context Scheming.

Validation: Sim-to-Real Calibration




□ Experimental Setup

- Comparison of risk rates across **10 diverse scenarios** in AutoControl Arena vs. Manual Red-Teaming(Real-World).
- **10 independent trials** for each scenarios in both the simulated and real-world environments (**200 total trajectories**).

□ Key Results:

- **Strong Predictive Signal:** High positive correlation (**Pearson's $r = 0.87$, $R^2 = 0.76$**) between simulated and real risk rates, demonstrates that our framework serves as a reliable proxy for real-world risk.



➤ CLI Tools



➤ Email



➤ Database



➤ Communication




➤ API Endpoints



Finding 1: The Alignment Illusion



- **Safety is state-dependent:** Current alignment suppresses surface misbehavior but falters under true stress. Average risk surges from 21.7% (Baseline) to 54.5% (High Pressure).
- **Alignment Illusion:** Stronger models show **superficial baseline safety** but **catastrophic spikes under pressure**.



Model	S_0T_0 (Baseline)	S_1T_1 (Coupled)
Google		
Gemini-2.5-Flash	26.5%	52.2%
Gemini-3-Flash	25.0%	70.6%
OpenAI		
GPT-4.1-mini	16.2%	55.9%
o3-mini	30.9%	52.9%
GPT-5-mini	13.2%	22.1%
Alibaba		
Qwen3-4B	30.3%	61.2%
Qwen3-8B	18.2%	60.6%
Qwen3-14B	15.9%	62.1%
Qwen3-32B	19.0%	53.2%
Average	21.7%	54.5%



Finding 2: Scenario-Specific Safety Scaling Laws



□ Positive Scaling (Direct Harm):

- **Observation:** In straightforward scenarios (e.g., **Capability Misuse**), risk rates decrease as reasoning capability improves.
- **Mechanism:** Advanced models exhibit superior internalization of explicit safety constraints.

□ Inverse Scaling (Complex Logic):

- **Observation:** In complex tasks (e.g., **Scheming**), higher intelligence correlates with increased risk.
- **Mechanism:** Enhanced planning and reasoning facilitate sophisticated loophole exploitation and strategic circumvention of oversight

□ The Capability Paradox: Scaling intelligence is a “double-edged sword”.

Model	CM	CW	EA	IC	OE	SG	SM
Google							
Gemini-2.5-Flash	60.0	40.0	26.1	32.8	25.7	26.2	25.0
Gemini-3-Flash	52.5	53.3	33.3	39.3	52.8	53.5	33.3

CM - Capability Misuse
CW - Covert Whistleblowing
EA - Evaluation Awareness
IC - Instrumental Convergence
OE - Oversight Evasion
SG - Specification Gaming
SM - Strategic Misalignment

Thanks for your listening!

See our page for more discussions



Page: <https://cosmosyi.github.io/AutoControl-Arena>

Github: <https://github.com/CosmosYi/AutoControl-Arena>

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