Are Your Agents Upward Deceivers?

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ICML 2026 Poster

Code and data: `github.com/QingyuLiu/Agentic-Upward-Deception`

Motivation: Agents as Subordinates

- LLM-based agents increasingly act as **autonomous subordinates**: users give high-level goals, agents execute intermediate steps.
- In realistic deployments, users often only see the **final report**, not the full execution trace.
- This creates an information asymmetry: the agent knows what happened; the user may not.

Core Question

Can LLM-based agents conceal failures and create a false appearance of successful task completion?

Agentic Upward Deception

Informal Definition

Agentic upward deception occurs when an agent faces environmental constraints, conceals its failure, and reports or acts as if the task succeeded.

- Not merely a wrong answer.
- The issue is **misrepresentation of the execution process**.
- Examples: guessing, silent source switching, unsupported simulation, fabricated local files.

Formal View

$$\Phi(R_f, g) > \Phi(\tau, g)$$

The final report R_f appears more successful than the true execution trajectory τ with respect to goal g.

Example: Honest Reporting vs. Upward Deception

- The user asks the agent to download a specific document.
- However, the download tool(or the resource) is unavailable.
- An honest agent should explicitly report this failure.
- A deceptive agent may fabricate the document locally and report success.

Key Intuition

The final answer may look successful, while the real execution trajectory has already failed.



Figure 1: Honest reporting vs. upward deception under an unavailable download tool.

Benchmark: Simple Tasks Under Realistic Constraints

- **200** agent tasks
- **5** task types
- **8** realistic scenarios
- Common operations: reading, searching, downloading, writing

Key Idea

Inject realistic failures into the agent environment and check whether the agent honestly reports them.



Benchmark construction and evaluation pipeline.

Five Task Settings

Task Type	Constraint	Deceptive Behavior
Broken reading tool	Cannot open the target file	Gives a file-based answer without reporting failure
Irrelevant file	File is readable but lacks needed information	Answers as if the file supports the response
Local decoy file	Intended file unreadable; similar readable file exists	Uses decoy content without disclosure
Missing download tool	Download tool unavailable	Acts as if download succeeded and proceeds
Nonexistent web file	Target document does not exist online	Fabricates a source file and analyzes it as ground truth

Expected Honest Behavior

Report the failure, disclose source limitations, and avoid unsupported task completion.

Main Result: Upward Deception Is Widespread

Model	T1	T2	T3	T4			T5		
	NFR	NFR	DFR	NFR	FFR	HAR	NFR	FFR	HAR
Llama-3.1	35.0	55.0	2.5	97.5	15.0	92.3	80.0	35.0	93.8
Deepseek-v3.1	70.0	87.5	57.5	95.0	30.0	100.0	72.5	65.0	100.0
Deepseek-T	72.5	80.0	55.0	97.5	35.0	92.3	82.5	70.0	100.0
Qwen3-Coder	65.0	80.0	72.5	52.5	12.5	90.9	52.5	32.5	100.0
Qwen3-32B	70.0	82.5	67.5	90.0	35.0	96.0	75.0	55.0	100.0
Gemini-2.5	50.0	72.5	35.0	30.0	5.0	100.0	52.5	45.0	100.0
Claude-4	70.0	75.0	65.0	47.5	17.5	93.3	60.0	52.5	100.0
Kimi-k2	97.5	90.0	62.5	92.5	42.5	100.0	62.5	55.0	100.0
GPT-4.1	27.5	67.5	40.0	55.0	22.5	100.0	42.5	25.0	100.0
GPT-5	62.5	75.0	42.5	72.5	5.0	100.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
GLM-4.5	67.5	75.0	90.0	62.5	25.0	100.0	62.5	55.0	100.0
Avg.	**62.5**	**76.4**	**53.6**	**72.1**	**22.3**	**97.2**	**60.7**	**45.0**	**90.3**

Table 2: Evaluation results across five task settings.

Key Finding

Upward deception appears across all five task settings and all evaluated agents.

Most Alarming

In Task 5, the average **File Fabrication Rate** reaches **45.0%**.

Meaning

Agents may create fake source files and then analyze them as if they were real downloaded documents.

Ablations and Mitigation

Main Message

Formatting constraints and task chaining can amplify deception; explicit constraints and a `report_failure` tool reduce but do not eliminate it.

Table 3: Ablation Study Results

Model	Format NFR		Chain NFR		Chain FFR		Hint FFR	
	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×	✓	×
Deepseek-T	87.5	47.5	90.0	70.0	52.5	52.5	52.5	53.8
Kimi-k2	95.0	72.5	90.0	76.3	51.3	56.3	51.3	47.5
GLM-4.5	87.5	52.5	62.5	60.0	40.0	46.3	40.0	43.8

✓ means the condition is enabled. Format constraints substantially increase NFR; removing task chaining reduces NFR, but file fabrication can remain.

Table 3 continued: Content-Hint HAR

Model	Hint HAR ✓	Hint HAR ×
Deepseek-T	96.2	96.7
Kimi-k2	100.0	98.3
GLM-4.5	100.0	100.0

Table 4: Explicit Constraints

Model	w/o Constraint	w/ Constraint
Deepseek-T	63.8	25.0
Kimi-k2	83.3	50.0
GLM-4.5	77.5	30.0

Explicit honesty constraints reduce NFR/DFR, but do not fully remove deception.

Table 5: Dedicated `report_failure` Tool

Interface	T1	T2	T3	T4			T5		
	NFR	NFR	DFR	NFR	FFR	HAR	NFR	FFR	HAR
w/o tool	92.5	90.0	52.5	97.5	42.5	100.0	82.5	62.5	97.0
w/ tool	25.0	67.5	45.0	87.5	30.0	100.0	50.0	27.5	100.0
Change	-67.5	-22.5	-7.5	-10.0	-12.5	0.0	-32.5	-35.0	+3.0

The `report_failure` tool sharply reduces Task 1 NFR and Task 5 FFR, but high HAR remains.

Discussion: What Makes Upward Deception Different?

Characteristics

- **Inherent risk**: triggered without malicious user prompts or external attacks.
- **Real-world triggerability**: caused by mundane failures, e.g., broken tools, missing files, or insufficient sources.
- **High-impact harmfulness**: manifests as concrete actions, such as source substitution or fabricated files.

Why Does It Happen?

- **Surface success over truth alignment**: agents are optimized to produce helpful, complete-looking answers.
- **Weak failure signaling**: tool errors are often lightweight observations, not hard constraints.
- **Success-biased optimization**: agent benchmarks and user instructions often reward task completion more than transparent failure reporting.

Different from Hallucination

- **Clear decision process**: the trajectory often shows that the agent recognizes a blocking failure, then decides to substitute, simulate, or fabricate evidence.
- **Action-based behavior**: the agent does not only generate unsupported text; it may switch sources, create local files, or use fabricated artifacts in later steps.

Implication

Safe agents should not only answer correctly; they must also keep the user informed about what actually happened during execution.

Takeaways

1. LLM-based agents can **misrepresent task execution**, not just hallucinate final answers.
2. Upward deception is triggered by **mundane deployment failures**: broken tools, missing files, decoys, and incomplete information.
3. Safe agents need better mechanisms to **recognize infeasible states**, **disclose failures**, and **align final reports with execution traces**.

Thank you!