SafeCompass: Dynamic Chain-of-Thought Steering via Inference-Time Safety Signals

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Background

Some existing studies have demonstrated that inserting safety prompts into the CoT process can enhance model safety.

- SafePath[1] enhances reasoning safety by injecting safety-emphasizing phrases immediately following the <think> token.
- SafeChain[2] improves reasoning integrity by inserting specific length-control tokens into the CoT, thereby suppressing harmful reasoning and bolstering model robustness.

However, these methods fail to reconcile the trade-off between defense effectiveness and over-refusal.

[1]. Jeung, W., Yoon, S., Kahng, M., and No, A. Safepath: Preventing harmful reasoning in chain-of-thought via early alignment. arXiv preprint arXiv:2505.14667, 2025.
[2]. Jiang, F., Xu, Z., Li, Y., Niu, L., Xiang, Z., Li, B., Lin, B. Y., and Poovendran, R. Safechain: Safety of language models with long chain-of-thought reasoning capabilities. In Che, W., Nabende, J., Shutova, E., and Pilehvar, M. T. (eds.), Findings of the Association for Computational Linguistics, ACL 2025

Background

We inserted the safety-guidance prompt at different positions in the chain-of-thought, yet failed to achieve satisfactory results in both safety performance and over-refusal mitigation.

Model	Insert Setting	DeepInception	ReNeLLM	CodeAttack	Chameleon	Avg.	Or Bench
Qwen3	Benign	0.05	0.25	0.07	0.13	0.125	0.68
	200 Tokens	0.41	0.63	0.16	0.38	0.395	0.02
	400 Tokens	0.53	0.65	0.25	0.35	0.445	0.01
	Without	0.62	0.70	0.55	0.38	0.563	0.01
DS-R1	Benign	0.02	0.11	0.07	0.09	0.073	0.49
	200 Tokens	0.41	0.64	0.11	0.12	0.320	0.16
	400 Tokens	0.46	0.63	0.13	0.11	0.333	0.10
	Without	0.45	0.63	0.15	0.22	0.363	0.01

Underlaying Reasons:

- On the one hand, unconditional insertion runs the risk of triggering superfluous safety reasoning for benign queries, leading to erroneous refusals.
- On the other hand, for different attack inputs, interventions at identical positions exhibit inconsistent defense efficacy.

Methodology: *SafeCompass*

We introduce ***SafeCompass***, a plug-and-play jailbreak defense framework designed to steer the model's reasoning back to safety when it "goes astray". Specifically, our framework dynamically determines:

- **whether to intervene—** distinguishing actual jailbreak scenarios from benign inputs to reconcile the trade-off between robustness and over-refusal;



- **where to inject guidance tokens—** identifying the optimal insertion point driven by the context sensitivity of interventions.

xxxxxx... (Context)
[If harmful content is detected...(Safety Prompt)]
yyyyyy... (Continous reasoning)

Two Stage of *SafeCompass*



- **The first stage is the calculation of safety score,** which is executed at various positions within the CoT. As depicted in the "Safety Score Calculation" panel, this involves constructing parallel inference branches to extract a safety direction vector from the model's internal states.

- **The second stage is the dynamic CoT intervention.** Leveraging the real-time safety score derived from the first stage, the framework continuously monitors the model's safety level; whenever the safety score falls below a threshold, guidance tokens are injected into the context. This targeted intervention effectively steers the reasoning away from harmful paths and realigns it with safety principles.

Two Stage of *SafeCompass*



Stage 1: Scfety Score Calculation

- **Parallel Inference: Construct safety prompt branch vs. dummy token baseline.**
- **Vector Extraction: Isolate pure 'safety direction' via top-layer hidden state differences.**
- **Real-Time Scoring: Derive Safety Score using cosine similarity between current CoT state and safety vector.**

This method relies on two critical insights:

- Our safety-related token sequence effectively shift the model's latent state towards a safety-oriented space, ensuring that state incorporates the safety representation.
- By constructing an equal-length blank control sequence to eliminate positional noise and preserve original semantics, we can accurately isolate the safety direction vector.

Experiment

Model	Defense	Prefix/Suffix-Based					Obfuscation-Based			Injection	Avg (↓)
		GCG	PAIR	ABJ	DEEPIN.	RENE.	CODEAT.	CHAME.	MOUSE.	H-COT	
QWEN3-8B	NO-DEN	0.16	0.31	0.59	0.62	0.70	0.55	0.38	0.41	0.96	0.520
	SR	0.00	0.11	0.08	0.16	0.36	0.13	0.31	0.29	0.79	0.248
	RPO	0.04	0.12	0.09	0.30	0.34	0.26	0.20	0.24	0.60	0.243
	SD	0.02	0.17	0.12	0.35	0.68	0.26	0.08	0.17	0.92	0.231
	JA	0.19	0.18	0.45	0.46	0.59	0.20	0.15	0.39	0.94	0.394
	PSR	0.12	0.29	0.04	0.37	0.13	0.28	0.32	0.41	0.96	0.324
	SP-ZS	0.06	0.17	0.03	0.11	0.42	0.23	0.26	0.30	0.81	0.266
	OURS	**0.00**	**0.02**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.01**	**0.04**	**0.01**	**0.04**	**0.06**	**0.020**
QWEN3-32B	NO-DEN	0.16	0.32	0.56	0.68	0.67	0.32	0.31	0.55	0.92	0.499
	SR	0.01	0.12	0.23	0.22	0.39	0.02	0.19	0.51	0.81	0.278
	RPO	0.04	0.11	0.11	0.15	0.08	0.27	0.17	0.42	0.46	0.201
	SD	0.03	0.02	0.00	0.18	0.60	0.04	0.06	0.25	0.84	0.224
	JA	0.12	0.24	0.46	0.57	0.62	0.32	0.13	0.45	0.96	0.430
	PSR	0.18	0.33	0.62	0.64	0.77	0.38	0.45	0.54	0.85	0.529
	SP-ZS	0.01	0.22	0.14	0.04	0.10	0.07	0.01	0.17	0.48	0.138
	OURS	**0.00**	**0.02**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.00**	**0.01**	0.02	**0.02**	**0.04**	**0.012**
DEEPSEEK-8B	NO-DEN	0.26	0.32	0.68	0.45	0.63	0.15	0.22	0.17	0.96	0.427
	SR	0.12	0.24	0.65	0.27	0.51	0.13	0.14	0.14	0.85	0.339
	RPO	0.17	0.25	0.57	0.35	0.53	0.06	0.15	0.11	0.98	0.351
	SD	0.00	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.49	0.07	0.00	0.24	0.92	0.196
	JA	0.17	0.13	0.52	0.14	0.37	0.09	0.07	0.11	0.90	0.239
	PSR	0.10	0.21	0.24	0.45	0.62	0.17	0.10	0.17	0.63	0.299
	SP-ZS	0.08	0.20	0.42	0.31	0.26	0.08	0.06	0.12	0.81	0.260
	OURS	**0.06**	**0.11**	**0.09**	**0.07**	**0.23**	**0.05**	**0.02**	**0.01**	**0.18**	**0.094**
DEEPSEEK-32B	NO-DEN	0.24	0.22	0.67	0.62	0.59	0.35	0.32	0.38	0.73	0.458
	SR	0.03	0.10	0.48	0.12	0.34	0.10	0.20	0.37	0.92	0.296
	RPO	0.00	0.09	0.26	0.15	0.27	0.27	0.17	0.31	0.54	0.229
	SD	0.08	0.13	0.25	0.18	0.21	0.05	0.09	0.04	0.60	0.181
	JA	0.17	0.18	0.48	0.29	0.53	0.15	0.27	0.37	0.58	0.336
	PSR	0.15	0.17	0.53	0.45	0.68	0.34	0.32	0.36	0.54	0.393
	SP-ZS	0.00	0.18	0.12	0.09	0.26	0.23	0.07	0.24	0.69	0.209
	OURS	**0.02**	**0.07**	**0.14**	**0.07**	**0.18**	**0.05**	**0.05**	**0.18**	**0.35**	**0.123**

- We evaluate the performance of various defense methods a cross different models agains t three categories of jailbreak attacks.
- SafeCompass demonstrates s uperior defensive performanc e by achieving the lowest AS R.
- **By leveraging hidden states to dynamically intervene at vulnerable positions during inference, it effectively neut ralizes prefix/suffix attacks, complex obfuscation tactics that other baselines struggl e to defend against.**

Experiment

Model	Defense	Over-Refusal(↓)		General(↑)		
		Or-Bench	XSTest	GSM8K	MMLU-Pro	Alpaca
Qwen3-8B	No-Den	0.01	0.02	0.915	0.719	0.824
	SR	0.03	0.06	0.875	0.719	0.642
	RPO	0.09	0.10	0.845	0.649	0.754
	SD	0.09	0.11	0.795	0.579	0.617
	JA	0.05	0.09	0.900	0.439	0.738
	PSR	0.01	0.01	0.905	0.737	0.805
	SP-ZS	0.03	0.02	0.875	0.702	0.770
	Ours	**0.01**	**0.00**	**0.910**	0.719	**0.837**
DeepSeek-8B	No-Den	0.00	0.01	0.670	0.614	0.224
	SR	0.03	0.03	0.640	0.439	0.203
	RPO	0.08	0.10	0.645	0.509	0.160
	SD	0.39	0.57	0.570	0.421	0.178
	JA	0.11	0.15	0.680	0.526	0.184
	PSR	0.00	0.06	0.650	0.544	0.210
	SP-ZS	0.00	0.12	0.645	0.561	0.209
	Ours	**0.01**	**0.00**	**0.660**	**0.614**	**0.222**

- Table 3 demonstrates that SafeCompass induces negligible over-refusal on benign queries while preserving the model's general utility.
- This efficiency is attributed to our safety-aware dynamic intervention strategy, which triggered interventions in only 18.54% of the cases.



- SafeCompass achieves the optimal trade-off between the average ASR(across 9 jailbreaks) and the Over-Refusal Rate on Or-Bench, demonstrating the best overall performance.

Deeper Analysis





- Applying our safety score calculation method to Qwen3-8B and DeepSeek-8B, the figure reveals a significant divergence in safety scores between jailbreak and benign scenarios.

- This distinct disparity serves as a critical indicator for when to intervene, allowing for targeted defenses against malicious attacks while minimizing interference on normal queries.

- When interventions are triggered above the threshold, there is no significant improvement in safety levels pre- and post-intervention.

- These findings demonstrate that At successfully guides where to intervene, thereby effectively enhancing the model's safety level.

Conclusion

- Introduce SafeCompass, a plug-and-play framework designed specifically for jailbreak defense in LRMs.
- Unlike existing fixed CoT interventions, it actively monitors inference-time safety signals to dynamically guide the reasoning process.
- It extracts latent safety directions on the fly via contrastive hidden-state analysis, successfully adapting to the complex, dynamic changes of safety levels during reasoning.

The code is available at https://github.com/x03azure/SafeCompass

Thanks for listening!