Furina: Fragmented Uncertainty-Driven Refusal Instability Attack

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https://github.com/0xCavaliers/Furina_Jailbreak

Executive summary

- Safety is not a crisp binary boundary; it is an **instability band** where small perturbations cause stochastic refusal behavior.
- Across rewrite ladders and jailbreaks, the paper finds a common signature: **ASR rises**, entropy rises, while internal safety signals **drop**.
- **Furina** decomposes a harmful request into safety-neutral probes plus a scene anchor, then synthesizes the evidence.
- Furina reaches strong ASR on HarmBench and MM-SafetyBench across multiple LLMs and MLLMs.

Why the binary-threshold view breaks

- The paper argues that many prior attacks and defenses assume a near-binary safety boundary.
- In practice, repeated sampling from the same harmful input can yield refusal, leakage, or compliance.
- Minor paraphrases can flip behavior, so safety is context-sensitive, not deterministic.
- For MLLMs, semantic similarity can change smoothly while safety flips abruptly.

Observed instability modes

- Text-only LLMs show three instability modes: semantic leakage, sampling inconsistency, and refusal erosion under rephrasing.
- In MLLMs, image fusion can produce smooth CLIP similarity changes but non-monotonic safety flips.
- This reveals a decoupling between semantic alignment and safety behavior.



Figure: Small perturbations can preserve meaning while causing refusal instability and safety flips.

Formalizing the instability band

$$\pi_\theta(x) := \mathbb{E}_{Y \sim p_\theta(\cdot|x)}[C(Y)] \tag{1}$$

- $p_\theta(y \mid x)$ is the output distribution for input x.
- $C(Y)$ is a binary compliance indicator.
- The paper defines stable refusal, instability, and stable compliance via thresholds τ_- and τ_+.
- Main claim: many harmful prompts lie in an intermediate instability region.

How the paper probes instability

- It uses a semantic rewrite ladder: Original, Minor, Moderate, High, Semantic.
- Each rewrite preserves malicious intent while increasing contextual diffusion.
- Sampling uses nucleus decoding with $T = 0.8$, $p = 0.9$, and $M = 8$ samples per query.
- Example: on Qwen3-8B, ASR rises from 0.02 to 0.77 from Original to Semantic.

External instability signals

$$H_{\text{tok}}(x) := \frac{1}{M} \sum_{m=1}^{M} \frac{1}{T^{(m)}} \sum_{t=1}^{T^{(m)}} \mathcal{H}(p_\theta(v \mid x, y_{<t}^{(m)})) \tag{2}$$

$$H_{\text{sem}}(x) := \frac{2}{M(M-1)} \sum_{1 \le i < j \le M} d\big(\phi(Y^{(i)}), \phi(Y^{(j)})\big) \tag{3}$$

- H_{tok} measures token-level uncertainty.
- H_{sem} measures semantic dispersion across samples.
- H_{tok} usually rises with rewrite strength; H_{sem} often peaks mid-ladder.

Internal safety signals decouple from behavior

$$\mathrm{HD}_{\max} = \max_{l \in \mathcal{L}_{\mathcal{M}}} \frac{\mathrm{proj}(\mathbf{h}_l) \cdot \mathbf{r}}{\|\mathrm{proj}(\mathbf{h}_l)\| \|\mathbf{r}\|} \tag{4}$$

$$\mathbf{r}^{(l)} = \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(l)}_{\text{harmful}} - \boldsymbol{\mu}^{(l)}_{\text{harmless}}, \qquad \mathrm{RD}_{\max} = \max_{l} \frac{\mathbf{a}^{(l)} \cdot \mathbf{r}^{(l)}}{\|\mathbf{r}^{(l)}\|} \tag{5}$$

- HiddenDetect and Refusal Direction probe internal refusal signals.
- The key result is inverse correlation: ASR and entropy rise while $\mathrm{HD}_{\max}$ and $\mathrm{RD}_{\max}$ fall.
- Example: on LLaMA-2-7B, $\mathrm{RD}_{\max}$ drops from 0.677 to 0.083 while ASR rises from 1% to 42%.

Representative jailbreaks share the same pattern

- The paper tests suffix optimization, automated prompt search, and multi-turn context attacks.
- All methods increase token entropy relative to the original prompt.
- The shared mechanism is **uncertainty amplification**.
- Furina also fits this diagnostic pattern and achieves the highest ASR in the table.



Figure: Furina decomposes a harmful request into safety-neutral probes and a shared scene anchor, then synthesizes the evidence into the final response.

Furina: core idea

- Furina is a fragmented uncertainty-driven jailbreak for both LLMs and MLLMs.
- Stage 1: decompose the request into structured semantics, then turn them into multiple safety-neutral probes plus a metaphorical scene.
- Stage 2: optionally realize the scene as a typographic image or diffusion-generated image.
- Stage 3: query the target on probes, then synthesize the final response from the distributed evidence.

Why Furina works

- The probes are not a simple escalation chain; they are decomposed fragments covering different aspects of the task.
- The scene anchor preserves cross-fragment association while reducing direct overlap with the harmful request.
- For MLLMs, the visual scene adds another cross-modal channel.
- This pushes the target into the instability band where uncertainty rises and safety activation weakens.

Experimental setup

- HarmBench: first 200 harmful queries.
- MM-SafetyBench: full harmful split with 1,680 image-text pairs.
- Targets: LLaMA-3-8B, Qwen2.5-VL-7B, GPT-4o-mini, GPT-4o, Gemini-2.5-Flash, Claude-Haiku-4.5.
- ASR is judged by GPT-4o with a five-point rubric; only score 5 counts as success.

Results on HarmBench

- Furina achieves the highest ASR on every evaluated LLM.
- On LLaMA-3-8B, Furina reaches 92.5% vs. 79.0% for ActorBreaker.
- On GPT-4o-mini, Furina reaches 94.0% vs. 82.0% for ActorBreaker.
- On Claude-Haiku-4.5-Thinking, Furina reaches 83.5% vs. 65.0% for ActorBreaker.



Figure: Furina dominates or matches the best baselines across multiple LLM targets on HarmBench.

Results on MM-SafetyBench

- Furina transfers well to multimodal settings.
- Furina (Typo) reaches 93.93% on Qwen2.5-VL-7B, 93.81% on GPT-4o-mini, and 92.79% on Gemini-2.5-Flash.
- On Claude-Haiku-4.5, Furina (Typo) reaches 77.20%, far above MML at 40.76%.
- Typographic realization generally outperforms diffusion.

Ablation and defense findings

- Removing semantic probes causes the largest drop; on some categories ASR collapses nearly to zero.
- Removing the scene anchor also lowers ASR, but less severely.
- Classical defenses are weak: LlamaGuard intercepts only $1/200$ samples and barely changes ASR.
- Perplexity filtering is threshold-sensitive and does not reliably stop final synthesis.

Conclusion

- The paper reframes jailbreak success as an **instability-band** phenomenon.
- Its diagnostic signature is: ASR and uncertainty rise while internal safety signals fall.
- Furina exploits this by fragmenting intent into benign probes plus a shared scene anchor.
- Robust defenses should reason over distributed intent, not just isolated prompts.