



# Diffusion-based Adversarial Purification from the

## Perspective of the Frequency Domain

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


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
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### **Background**



#### **Motivation**

we can decompose adversarial samples into clean semantic information and corrupted semantic information




We can use the **clean semantic information** to **guide** the reverse process of diffusion model.



#### **Motivation**

Different frequency components have varying degrees of influence on the neural network's predictions.



This motivates us that we can investigate the distribution of adversarial perturbations from the perspective of frequency domain.


### **Preliminary**

Discrete Fourier transform (DFT)


$$\mathbf{x}_0(u,v) = DFT(\mathbf{x}_0) = \left[ |\mathbf{x}_0(u,v)| e^{i\phi_{\mathbf{x}_0}(u,v)} \right]$$

Amplitude Phase

Frequency of coordinate (u,v)  $D(u,v) = [(u - H/2)^2 + (v - W/2)^2]^{\frac{1}{2}}$ 



### **Experimental Phenomenon**




For Both the Amplitude Spectrum and the Phase Spectrum, the Degradation Caused by Adversarial Perturbations Exhibits an Approximately Monotonically Increasing Trend with Frequency

#### **Experimental Phenomenon**

Low-frequency components represent Clean Semantic Information, while high-frequency components represent Damaged Semantic Information.

#### Why Current Methods Fail?



Intuitively, the forward process involves both high-frequency and low-frequency information. Here, we provide a rigorous **theoretical proof** of this.

## **Theoretical Analysis**

**Theorem 3.1** The variance of the first-order approximation of the difference of phase between clean image  $\mathbf{x}_0$  and noisy image  $\mathbf{x}_t$  at arbitrary coordinates (u, v) at frequency domain is as follows:


$$Var(\Delta\theta_t(u,v)) = \frac{1}{\sqrt{1 - \frac{1}{SNR_t^2(u,v)}}} - 1,$$

**Theorm 3.2** The variance of the difference of amplitude at time-step t between clean image  $\mathbf{x}_0$  and noisy image  $\mathbf{x}_t$  at arbitrary coordinates (u, v) at frequency domain is as follows:


$$Var(\Delta A_t(u,v)) \approx \frac{1-\overline{\alpha}_t}{2} - \frac{(1-\overline{\alpha}_t)^2}{16|\mathbf{x}_0(u,v)|\overline{\alpha}_t}.$$

For both the **phase spectrum** and the **amplitude spectrum**, the forward process causes a **monotonically increasing** degradation of all frequency components with respect to t.

#### **Theorem Validation**



#### **Framework**




The core of our method is to preserve, at each time-step of the reverse process, the amplitude and phase spectrum information of the original clean samples extracted from adversarial images as a prior.

### **Experimental Result**

Table 1. Standard and robust accuracy of different Adversarial Training (AT) and Adversarial Purification (AP) methods against PGD and AutoAttack  $\ell_{\infty}(\epsilon=8/255)$  on CIFAR-10. \* utilizes half number of iterations for the attack due to the high computational cost. † indicates the requirement of extra data. The result with an underline indicates the second highest.

Туре	Method	Standard Acc.	Robust Acc.	
			PGD	AutoAttack
	Wide	ResNet-28-10		
AT	(Gowal et al., 2021)	88.54	65.93	63.38
	(Gowal et al., 2020)†	87.51	66.01	62.76
	(Pang et al., 2022)	88.62	64.95	61.04
AP	(Yoon et al., 2021)	85.66±0.51	33.48±0.86	59.53±0.87
	(Nie et al., 2022)	90.07±0.97	56.84±0.59	63.60±0.81
	(Lee & Kim, 2023)	90.16±0.64	55.82±0.59	70.47±1.53
	(Bai et al., 2024)	91.41	49.22*	77.08
	(Zollicoffer et al., 2025)	84.20		59.14
	(Lin et al., 2024)	90.62	-	72.85
	Ours	92.19 ±0.33	59.39±0.79	77.35±2.14

Experimental Result on WideResNet28-10



Distribution of Purified Natural Examples