

**ICML**  
International Conference  
On Machine Learning



# ROME is Forged in Adversity: RObust Distilled Datasets via InforMation BottlenEck

■ ■ ■ Zheng Zhou<sup>1</sup>, Wenquan Feng<sup>1</sup>, Qiaosheng Zhang<sup>2 3</sup>, Shuchang Lyu<sup>1 \*</sup>, Qi Zhao<sup>1</sup>, Guangliang Cheng<sup>4</sup> ■ ■ ■

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\*Corresponding Author



Code



Project Page




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# What is Dataset Distillation?

**Dataset distillation** compresses large datasets into compact synthetic subsets, significantly reducing training time and computation while maintaining model performance.

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
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


High accuracy on source dataset



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


# Efficiency Without Security

Most dataset distillation methods are efficient but **vulnerable to adversarial attacks**, limiting their reliability in safety-critical areas like face recognition, autonomous driving, and object detection.

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
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


No **mutual information** is modeled among  $\mathcal{X}$ ,  $\mathcal{Z}$  and  $\mathcal{Y}$




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
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
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
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
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
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
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Dataset distillation improves efficiency, but not **robustness**.


# How to enhance the robustness of models?

Adversarial robustness is a key research focus. A common way to improve it is **adversarial training**, but this method is **costly** and **hard to apply** in data-efficient settings like dataset distillation.




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


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# Existing Challenges




Step 1: Train on distilled dataset

Step 2: Retrain on distilled dataset with adversarial perturbations




# Existing Challenges



➡ **High retraining cost**, making the process computationally expensive.

Step 2: Retrain on distilled dataset with adversarial perturbations


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
# ROME: RObust distilled datasets via InforMation BottlenEck

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## Overview of ROME



(a) Performance-aligned Term




(b) Robustness-aligned Term




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
## Formulating ROME via information bottleneck

$$\text{ROME} = I(\mathcal{Y}; \mathcal{Z}) - \beta I(\mathcal{X}; \mathcal{Z} | \hat{\mathcal{X}})$$


$$\geq \mathbb{E}_{p(x, \hat{x}, y)p(z|x, \hat{x}, y)} \left[ \log q(y | z) - \beta \log \frac{p(z | x)}{q(z | \hat{x})} \right]$$

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


## Performance-aligned term


$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{\text{Perf\_Alig}} &= \mathbb{E}_{p(x, \hat{x}, y)p(z|x, \hat{x}, y)} [\log q(y | z)] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{p(x, \hat{x}, y)} [\text{CE} [y^t, f(x)]] \end{aligned}$$

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### Performance-aligned term

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### Robustness-aligned term

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{L}_{\text{Rob\_Alig}} &= \mathbb{E}_{p(x, \hat{x}, y)p(z|x, \hat{x}, y)} \left[ \beta \log \frac{p(z | x)}{q(z | \hat{x})} \right] \\ &= \mathbb{E}_{p(x, \hat{x}, y)} \left\| \mathbb{E}_{x \sim \mathcal{X}} [e(x)] - \mathbb{E}_{\hat{x} \sim \hat{\mathcal{X}}} [e(\hat{x})] \right\|^2 \end{aligned}$$



# Experimental Results

The adversarial robustness of ROME and other dataset distillation methods is evaluated under **white-box attack settings**.

Table 1. Comparison of model robustness when trained using various DD methods with IPC settings of  $\{1, 10, 50\}$ , against both white-box targeted and untargeted attacks on the CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100 datasets. Robustness evaluation metrics include RR and CREI, as well as their improved versions I-RR and I-CREI. The best results between the baseline and proposed methods are highlighted in **bold**, while the second-best results are underlined. Improvements in metrics compared to the second-best results are highlighted in **red**.

Dataset	Method	Targeted Attack				Untargeted Attack			
		RR	CREI	I-RR	I-CREI	RR	CREI	I-RR	I-CREI
CIFAR-10	Full-size	20.42%	24.98%	67.24%	48.39%	28.33%	25.12%	28.82%	25.36%
	DC <sup>2020</sup>	30.79%	29.35%	<u>88.51%</u>	<u>58.21%</u>	31.87%	26.70%	56.02%	38.78%
	DSA <sup>2021</sup>	45.22%	<u>36.43%</u>	86.81%	<u>57.22%</u>	<u>36.53%</u>	27.75%	53.66%	36.32%
	MTT <sup>2022</sup>	36.00%	32.26%	83.95%	56.24%	33.30%	26.26%	48.34%	33.77%
	DM <sup>2023</sup>	<u>46.01%</u>	36.01%	85.76%	55.89%	34.50%	28.32%	<u>56.19%</u>	<u>39.16%</u>
	IDM <sup>2023</sup>	32.35%	27.75%	87.07%	55.11%	33.03%	<u>28.46%</u>	53.43%	38.66%
	BACON <sup>2024</sup>	36.83%	33.05%	84.37%	56.82%	32.87%	27.20%	50.49%	36.01%
	<b>ROME</b>	<b>81.36%</b> ( <b>35.35</b> ↑)	<b>55.28%</b> ( <b>18.85</b> ↑)	<b>97.44%</b> ( <b>8.93</b> ↑)	<b>63.32%</b> ( <b>5.11</b> ↑)	<b>49.86%</b> ( <b>13.33</b> ↑)	<b>35.05%</b> ( <b>6.59</b> ↑)	<b>67.01%</b> ( <b>10.82</b> ↑)	<b>43.62%</b> ( <b>4.46</b> ↑)
CIFAR-100	Full-size	6.77%	18.18%	65.50%	47.55%	19.91%	18.60%	20.08%	18.69%
	DC <sup>2020</sup>	33.11%	30.31%	<u>77.14%</u>	<u>52.32%</u>	<u>28.74%</u>	<u>22.40%</u>	32.33%	<u>24.19%</u>
	DSA <sup>2021</sup>	<u>43.97%</u>	<u>35.01%</u>	72.97%	49.51%	28.53%	20.40%	<u>33.29%</u>	22.77%
	MTT <sup>2022</sup>	36.06%	31.16%	74.54%	50.40%	26.07%	19.65%	31.10%	22.17%
	DM <sup>2023</sup>	39.32%	31.32%	71.29%	47.30%	26.72%	19.78%	29.74%	21.28%
	IDM <sup>2023</sup>	34.44%	27.16%	74.57%	47.23%	26.28%	20.36%	30.83%	22.63%
	BACON <sup>2024</sup>	31.81%	29.78%	69.96%	48.86%	25.26%	19.30%	27.42%	20.38%
	<b>ROME</b>	<b>103.09%</b> ( <b>59.12</b> ↑)	<b>66.18%</b> ( <b>31.17</b> ↑)	<b>100.65%</b> ( <b>23.51</b> ↑)	<b>64.96%</b> ( <b>12.64</b> ↑)	<b>44.10%</b> ( <b>15.36</b> ↑)	<b>28.29%</b> ( <b>5.89</b> ↑)	<b>46.24%</b> ( <b>12.95</b> ↑)	<b>29.36%</b> ( <b>5.17</b> ↑)



# Experimental Results

The adversarial robustness of ROME and other dataset distillation methods is evaluated under **black-box attack settings**.

Table 2. Comparison of model robustness measured by I-RR for various dataset distillation methods with IPC-50 under targeted and untargeted transfer-based and query-based black-box attacks on CIFAR-10. Best results are in **bold**, second-best underlined, and improvements over the second-best highlighted in **red**.

Method	Targeted Attack		Untargeted Attack	
	Transfer	Query	Transfer	Query
DC	85.84%	88.71%	83.97%	43.81%
DSA	<u>94.09%</u>	<u>94.95%</u>	<u>92.31%</u>	54.60%
MTT	91.40%	92.76%	89.02%	48.71%
DM	92.22%	93.86%	90.36%	57.53%
IDM	92.17%	94.37%	89.22%	63.23%
BACON	92.46%	94.67%	89.25%	<u>63.26%</u>
<b>ROME</b>	<b>99.90%</b> (5.81 ↑)	<b>99.79%</b> (4.84 ↑)	<b>98.44%</b> (6.13 ↑)	<b>78.46%</b> (15.2 ↑)




Figure 3. Robustness heatmap of models trained using diverse dataset distillation methods with IPC-50 on CIFAR-10 under targeted and untargeted attacks. The vertical axis represents attacked models, and the horizontal axis shows models used for transfer attacks. Heatmap values represent I-RR, with **darker colors** indicating **higher I-RR** and thus **better robustness** against adversarial attacks.

# Experimental Results

The **adversarial robustness** and **training efficiency** of ROME and other dataset distillation methods are evaluated.

Table 3. Comparison of adversarial robustness (I-CREI, %) and training time (hours) of ROME and baseline dataset distillation methods on CIFAR-10 (IPC-50) under targeted attacks. “Base” indicates standard distillation training, while “+AdvTrain” refers to the additional time required for adversarial training to improve robustness. Best results, balancing robustness and efficiency, are highlighted in **bold**, and <sup>†</sup> denotes consistent results from “Base” to “+AdvTrain”, indicating no need for adversarial fine-tuning.

Method	I-CREI		Training Time	
	Base	+AdvTrain	Base	+AdvTrain
DC	58.21%	63.43%	0.425	1.088
DSA	57.22%	63.46%	0.437	1.103
MTT	56.24%	62.44%	0.444	1.088
DM	55.89%	63.21%	0.452	1.109
IDM	55.11%	63.11%	0.414	1.055
BACON	56.82%	62.68%	0.442	1.101
ROME	<b>63.32%</b>	<b>63.32%</b> <sup>†</sup>	<b>0.418</b>	<b>0.418</b> <sup>†</sup>



# Experimental Results

Ablation studies are conducted on **various configurations**, with visualizations illustrating the **impact of different hyperparameters**.

Table 4. Ablation studies on the Robust Pretrained Model (RPM) and Adversarial Perturbation (AP) under both targeted and untargeted attacks, evaluated by I-RR and I-CREI on the CIFAR-10 dataset with IPC-50. Best results are highlighted in **bold**.

Configuration	Targeted Attack		Untargeted Attack	
	I-RR	I-CREI	I-RR	I-CREI
Baseline	81.86%	55.26%	32.45%	29.29%
+RPM	84.50%	56.53%	34.89%	30.45%
+AP	94.66%	61.67%	47.64%	36.78%
+RPM&AP	<b>97.73%</b>	<b>63.23%</b>	<b>51.73%</b>	<b>38.95%</b>




Figure 4. Ablation study of the hyperparameter  $\alpha$ . (a) Displays the accuracy (y-axis) as a function of  $\alpha$  (x-axis) for different values of  $\alpha$ , and (b) shows the corresponding visualizations for these values.

# Thank you!

If you're interested in **adversarial robustness** or **dataset distillation**, *feel free to reach out.*

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**Personal Website:** <https://zhouzhengqd.github.io/>

Scan the QR codes for more information.



Code



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