# Adapting to game trees in zero－sum imperfect information games 

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Two－player Zero－sum IIG with Perfect Recall
$\mathcal{S}$ ：State space of size $S$ ，Horizon $H$
$\mathcal{X}$ ：Max－player＇s information set space of size $X$
$\mathcal{A}$ ：Max－player＇s action space of size $A$
$\mathcal{Y}$ ：Min－player＇s information set space of size $Y$
$\mathcal{B}$ ：Min－player＇s action space of size $B$
$r_{h}, p_{h}$ ：Reward／loss function and state－transition dynamics


Fig 1．An IIG with $H=2, \mathcal{A}=\left\{a_{1}, a_{2}\right\}$ ，and $\mathcal{B}=\left\{b_{1}, b_{2}\right\}$ ．Only max－ player＇s information sets are shown．

## The Problem

Find an approximation through self－play of an optimal strategy for a zero－sum imperfect information game only using trajectory feedback．

## Our Contributions

－Propose two computationally efficient algorithms，by combining implicit exploration and follow the regularized leader．
－If applied by both players，the first has an optimal high－ probability sample complexity of order $H(A X+B Y) / \varepsilon^{2}$ requiring the knowledge of the structure．
－The second has a sample complexity of order $H^{2}(A X+B Y) / \varepsilon^{2}$ without this knowledge，using an adaptive regularization．

## Regret，Average Profile，and Nash Equilibrium

For a profile $(\mu, \nu)$ ，the expected return（of the max－player）is defined by

$$
V^{\mu, v}=\mathbb{E}^{\mu, v}\left[\sum_{h=1}^{H} r_{h}\left(s_{h}, a_{h}, b_{h}\right)\right]
$$

When a profile $(\mu, v)$ satisfies the following，it is said to be an $\varepsilon$－NE：

$$
\max _{\mu^{\prime}} V^{\mu^{\prime}, v}-\min _{\nu} V^{\mu, v^{\prime}} \leq \varepsilon
$$

For a sequence of profiles $\left(\mu^{t}, v^{t}\right)$ ，the regret of the max－player is

$$
\mathfrak{R}_{\max }^{T}=\max _{\mu} \sum_{t=1}^{T}\left(V^{\mu, v^{t}}-V^{\mu^{t}, v^{t}}\right)
$$

The time－averaged profile $(\bar{\mu}, \bar{v})$ is an $\varepsilon$－NE with：

$$
\varepsilon=\frac{\mathfrak{R}_{\max }^{T}+\Re_{\min }^{T}}{T}
$$

| Algorithm | Sample complexity | Structure－free |
| :--- | :---: | :---: |
| MCCFR（Farina et al．，2020；Bai et al．，2022） | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(H^{4}(A X+B Y) / \varepsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\mathbf{x}$ |
| IXOMD（Kozuno et al．，2021） | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(H^{2}\left(A X^{2}+B Y^{2}\right) / \varepsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\checkmark$ |
| Balanced OMD（Baie etal．，2022） | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(H^{3}(A X+B Y) / \varepsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\mathbf{x}$ |
| Balanced FTRL（this paper） | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(H(A X+B Y) / \varepsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\mathbf{x}$ |
| Adaptive FTRL（this paper） | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(H^{2}(A X+B Y) / \varepsilon^{2}\right)$ | $\mathbf{\checkmark}$ |
| Lower bound（this paper） | $\widetilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(H(A \mathcal{X}+B \mathcal{Y}) / \varepsilon^{2}\right)$ |  |

Sample complexity for various algorithms．Structure－free means that the algorithm does not need to know the structure of the information set spaces in advance．

Algorithm 1 Adaptive FTRL for the max－player
1：Input：
Base learning rate $\eta$ and IX bias $\gamma$
Uniform policy $\mu^{0}$
$\mu_{1: h}(x, a)$ denotes the combined probability for the
max－player of choosing actions that lead to $(x, a)$
2：For $t=1$ to $T$
For all $h$ and $x_{h} \in \mathcal{X}_{h}$ ，compute learning rate $\eta_{h}^{t}\left(x_{h}\right) \leftarrow \min _{x_{h^{\prime}}^{\prime} \geq x_{h}} \eta /\left(1+\widetilde{P}_{h}^{t-1}\left(x_{h^{\prime}}^{\prime}\right)\right)$
For all $a_{h} \in \mathcal{A}\left(x_{h}\right)$ ，compute bias rate：
$\gamma_{h}^{t}\left(x_{h}, a_{h}\right) \leftarrow \gamma /\left(1+\widetilde{P}_{h}^{t-1}\left(x_{h}, a_{h}\right)\right)$

## Compute update

$\mu^{t} \leftarrow \operatorname{argmin}_{\mu} \sum_{h}\left\langle\mu_{1: h}, \tilde{L}_{h}^{t-1}\right\rangle+\mathcal{D}_{\eta^{t}}\left(\mu, \mu^{0}\right)$
with $\mathcal{D}_{\eta}\left(\mu, \mu^{0}\right)=\sum_{x} \mu_{1: h}(x) \operatorname{KL}\left(\mu(\cdot \mid x), \mu^{1}(\cdot \mid x)\right) / \eta(x)$

$$
\text { For } h=1 \text { to } H:
$$

Observe information set $x_{h}^{t}$
Execute $a_{h}^{t} \sim \mu^{t}\left(. \mid x_{h}^{t}\right)$ and receive reward $r_{h}^{t}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \left.\widetilde{L}_{h}^{t} \leftarrow \widetilde{L}_{h}^{t-1}+\mathbb{I}_{\left\{x_{h}^{t_{n}, a_{h}^{t}}\right.}\right\}\left(1-r_{h}^{t}\right) /\left(\mu_{1: h}^{t}+\gamma_{h}^{t}\right) \\
& \left.\widetilde{P}_{h}^{t} \leftarrow \widetilde{P}_{h}^{t-1}+\mathbb{I}_{\left\{x_{h}^{t}, a_{h}^{t}\right\}}\right\}\left(\mu_{1: h}^{t}+\gamma_{h}^{t}\right)
\end{aligned}
$$

Return average policy $\bar{\mu}$

