






JHU vision lab

# Reverse Engineering $\ell_p$ attacks: A block-sparse optimization approach with recovery guarantees

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THE DEPARTMENT OF BIOMEDICAL ENGINEERING


The Whitaker Institute at Johns Hopkins



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# Reverse engineering $\ell_p$ attacks


- **Objective:** Given signal  $x'$  adversarially corrupted using attack from toolchain  $A = \{a_1, a_2, \dots\}$



- Denoise  $x'$  and then classify **clean signal**  $x$  and classify **adversarial perturbation**  $\delta$  (e.g., find its  $\ell_p$ -bounded attack family)

# Reverse engineering $\ell_p$ attacks


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- Denoise  $x'$  and then classify **clean signal**  $x$  and classify **adversarial perturbation**  $\delta$  (e.g., find its  $\ell_p$ -bounded attack family)
- **Idea:** Use block-sparse representations of  $x$  and  $\delta$  on predefined dictionaries to formulate optimization problem

# Sparse Representation-based Classification


- Represent  $x'$  as a **block-sparse** combination of training examples in  $D_S$



$x'$  is sparsely represented

# Sparse Representation-based Classification

- Represent  $x'$  as a **block-sparse** combination of training examples in  $D_S$



- Find **sparse coefficients** and **corruptions** by solving the following optimization problem

$$\min_{\{c_S, \delta\}} \|c_S\|_{1,2} + \|\delta\|_1 \quad \text{such that } x' = D_S c_S + \delta$$

assumed to be sparse


# Proposed approach to structured sparse attacks

- **Modelling assumption:**

$$x' = D_s c_s + D_a c_a$$

- **Optimization problem:**

$$\min_{c_s, c_a} \|c_s\|_{1,2} + \|c_a\|_{1,2} \quad \text{such that } x' = D_s c_s + D_a c_a$$



# Proposed approach to structured sparse attacks

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- **Challenge:** Is this modelling assumption realistic?
  - **Contribution 1:** We theoretically demonstrate that gradient-based test-time attacks are sparse linear combinations of gradient-based train-time attacks

# Proposed approach to structured sparse attacks

- **Modelling assumption:**

$$x' = D_s c_s + D_a c_a$$

- **Optimization problem:**

$$\min_{c_s, c_a} \|c_s\|_{1,2} + \|c_a\|_{1,2} \quad \text{such that } x' = D_s c_s + D_a c_a$$

- **Challenge:** Does solving the above problem provably work?
  - **Contribution 2:** We show geometric recovery guarantees for recovering the correct signal and attack class
    - Assuming that subspaces are sufficiently separated and atoms of signal and attack dictionaries are well-distributed in the subspaces they span





# Proposed approach to structured sparse attacks

- **Modelling assumption:**

$$x' = D_s c_s + D_a c_a$$


- **Optimization problem:**

$$\min_{c_s, c_a} \|c_s\|_{1,2} + \|c_a\|_{1,2} \quad \text{such that } x' = D_s c_s + D_a c_a$$

- **Challenge:** Can we efficiently solve the optimization problem?
  - **Contribution 3:** We develop an efficient active set homotopy algorithm
    - Solve sequence of problems restricted to few nonzero blocks of dictionary

# Experiments: MNIST Dataset

- We show effectiveness of our approach as a defense against a union of different attacks



# Conclusion

- **Modelling:** Developed a model for signal and adversarial attack classification using a block-sparse modelling assumption
- **Validity:** Theoretically demonstrated validity of the modelling assumption for gradient-based attacks
- **Theory:** Proved geometric recovery guarantees for correct signal and attack recovery
- **Efficiency:** Developed an efficient algorithm to solve problem in practice

Thank you!