## Fundamental tradeoffs in distributionally adversarial training

#### Mohammad Mehrabi

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> joint with Adel Javanmard (USC), Ryan A. Rossi( Adobe Research), Anup B. Rao (Adobe Reseach), Tung Mai (Adobe Reseach)

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classified as Max Speed 100

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• Vulnerable to small discrepancies between training and test populations:



- Adversarial training is an effective technique to improve robustness
- Adversarial training degrades the model accuracy on benign test inputs

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## Classic supervised learning setup

- Data  $\{z_i = (x_i, y_i)\}_{i=1:n} \stackrel{\text{iid}}{\sim} \mathbb{P}_z(\mathcal{Z})$  on metric space  $\mathcal{Z}$  and norm d(.,.)
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- Assess model  $\theta$  performance: **Standard Risk:**  $SR(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{z=(x,y)\sim P_z}[\ell(\theta;z)]$ Expected loss on a new test data point from training population  $P_z$

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Model performance when there is a distributional shift  $\Rightarrow$  Adversarial Risk

Game between learner and adversary

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## Main results

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- For three classes of statistical learning problems, indeed a tradeoff between standard and adversarial risk is manifested:
  - i) Linear regression
  - ii) Binary classification under a Gaussian mixtures model

ii) The problem of learning an unknown function over a high-dimensional sphere using random features model

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• Characterize such tradeoffs + effect of a variety of factors on them: problem dimension, adversary's power, complexity of the model class (e.g number of neurons)



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Adversarial Risk: 
$$AR(\theta) = \sup_{Q \in \mathcal{U}_{\epsilon}(P_Z)} E_{z=(x,y)\sim Q}[\ell(\theta;z)]$$

 $\begin{array}{ll} \left( \text{Wasserstein ball} \right) & \mathcal{U}_{\varepsilon}(P) = \left\{ Q: W(Q,P) \leq \varepsilon \right\}, \\ \left( \text{Wasserstein distance} \right) & W(Q,P) = \inf_{\pi \in \mathsf{Cpl}(Q,P)} \left( \mathbb{E}_{(z_1,z_2) \sim \pi} [d^2(z_1,z_2)] \right)^{1/2}, \\ \left( \text{Metric on data points} \right) & d(z,z') = ||x - x'||_{\ell_r} + \infty \cdot \mathbb{I}_{\{y \neq y'\}} \end{array}$ 

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### Adversarial Risk dual problem:

$$\min_{\gamma \ge 0} \left\{ \gamma \varepsilon^2 + \mathbb{E}_{P_z} \left[ \underbrace{\Phi_{\gamma}(\theta; z)}_{\text{reburt currents for } \ell(\theta; z)} \right] \right\}$$

robust surrogate for  $\ell(\theta; z)$ 

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## Strong duality holds for Polish space $\mathcal{Z}$ .

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Pareto-optimal tradeoff: linear regression

$$y = x^{\mathsf{T}}\theta_0 + \mathsf{N}(0,1), \quad x \sim \mathsf{N}(0,\Sigma_{\mathbf{d}}), \quad \Sigma_{ij} = \rho^{|i-j|}$$
(square loss)  $\ell(\theta; (x,y)) = (y - x^{\mathsf{T}}\theta)^2$ 

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(a) Pareto optimal curve for (b) Pareto optimal curve for (c) Pareto optimal curve for several feature dimensions d.

several feature dependency values  $\rho$ .

several adversary's manipulative power  $\varepsilon$  .

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Pareto-optimal tradeoff: binary classification

$$\begin{split} y \in \{+1, -1\}, \quad x \sim \mathsf{N}\left(y\mu, \Sigma_d\right), \quad \Sigma_{ij} = \rho^{|i-j|} \\ (\text{linear classifiers}) \quad \ell(\theta; (x, y)) = \mathbb{I}\{yx^\mathsf{T}\theta \leq 0\} \\ (\text{metric on samples}) \ d(z, z') = ||x - x||_{\ell_r} + \infty \cdot \mathbb{I}\{y \neq y'\} \end{split}$$

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several  $\ell_r$  norms on feature space.

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(a) Pareto optimal curve for (b) Pareto optimal curve for (c) Pareto optimal curve for several adversary's manipulative power  $\varepsilon$ .

## Pareto-optimal tradeoff: learning non-linear functions

$$\begin{split} x &\sim \mathsf{Unif}\left(\mathbb{S}^{d-1}(\sqrt{d})\right)\,,\\ f(x) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1^\mathsf{T} x + \underbrace{\frac{\beta_2}{d}\left(x^\mathsf{T} G x - \mathsf{tr}(G)\right)}_{\text{quadratic with } G^{\mathsf{iid}}_\sim\mathsf{N}(0,1)} + \mathsf{N}(0,\sigma^2) \end{split}$$

 $(\text{random features model}) \left\{ f(x,\theta,U) = \theta^T \sigma(Ux), U \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times d}, \theta \in \mathbb{R}^N \right\}, \quad \text{rows of } U \overset{iid}{\sim} \mathbb{S}^{d-1}(1)$ 

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$$\begin{split} x &\sim \mathsf{Unif}\left(\mathbb{S}^{d-1}(\sqrt{d})\right)\,,\\ f(x) &= \beta_0 + \beta_1^\mathsf{T} x + \underbrace{\frac{\beta_2}{d}\left(x^\mathsf{T} G x - \mathsf{tr}(G)\right)}_{\mathsf{quadratic with } G^{\mathrm{iid}}_\mathsf{N}\mathsf{N}(0,1)} + \mathsf{N}(0,\sigma^2) \end{split}$$

 $\text{(random features model)} \left\{ f(x,\theta,U) = \theta^T \sigma(Ux), U \in \mathbb{R}^{N \times d}, \theta \in \mathbb{R}^N \right\}, \quad \text{rows of } U \overset{iid}{\sim} \mathbb{S}^{d-1}(1)$ 



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radeoffs in adversarial training

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