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Federated Learning of User verification Models Without Sharing Embeddings

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Federated Learning (FL)



User Verification (UV)

- User verification is the task of accepting/rejecting users based on their input data.
 - Usually done using some biometric data such as face, voice, fingerprint, etc.
 - Deployed on edge devices for unlocking the device or providing specific services.



User Verification Models- Training and Inference

- UV with machine learning:
 - Cluster users' data in embedding space, s.t. embedding of data of each user is:
 - Close to the embedding vector of that user,
 - Far away from embedding vectors of other users.





• Training loss function: $\ell = l_{pos} + \lambda l_{neg}$

• $l_{\text{pos}} = d(g(x), w_y)$ \rightarrow minimizes distance of g(x) to embedding vector of corresponding user.

• $l_{\text{neg}} = -\min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), w_u) \rightarrow \text{maximizes distance to embedding vectors of other users.}$

Challenges of Training UV Models

- Data collection:
 - UV models need to be trained with large and diverse data for best performance.
 - Collecting data centrally not feasible due to privacy constraints of raw biometric inputs.
 - Use federated learning: FL enables training without having direct access to data.
- How about embeddings?
 - Embeddings are used for verifying users, hence are security-sensitive info and cannot be shared with server or other users
 - \Rightarrow users cannot compute $l_{\text{neg}} = -\min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), w_u)$
 - Training with only $l_{\text{pos}} = d(g(x), w_y)$ causes all embeddings to collapse into same vector (loss will be 0).

Related Work: Federated Averaging with Spreadout (FedAwS), [ICML '20]

- Theorem: higher min distance between embeddings → higher classification accuracy.
 What we want: train with l_{pos} and ensure w_i's are highly separable.
- Original loss function: $\ell(x, y; g, w) = d(g(x), w_y) \lambda \sum_{u \neq y} d(g(x), w_u)$ • FedAwS loss function: $\ell(x, y; g, w) = d(g(x), w_y) - \lambda \sum_{u \neq y} d(w_y, w_u)$

done by users done by server

- \circ **Theorem:** positive loss + spreadout loss ~ original loss.
- Problem: embedding of each user is kept private from other users but not from server.

Proposed Method: Federated User Verification (FedUV)



- Users jointly learn a set of vectors (W), but each user minimizes distance of g(x) to a secret linear combination (v) of those vectors.
- Original loss function: $\ell(x, y; g, w) = d(g(x), w_y) \lambda \min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), w_u)$ • **FedUV** loss function: $\ell(x, y; g, w) = d(g(x), W^T v_y) - \lambda \min_{u \neq y} d(g(x), W^T v_u)$

Error-correcting Codes (ECCs) Codewords as Secret Vectors

- Theorem: With v_u 's chosen from ECC codewords, minimizing l_{pos} also minimizes l_{neg} . \circ Hence, negative loss term becomes redundant.
- How to construct secret codewords?



- **Properties:**
 - Vectors are unique because the user ID is unique,
 - Vectors are secret because the random vector is not known to other users or the server,
 - Vectors are guaranteed to be **maximally separated** due to the use of ECC algorithms.

Experimental Results- UV with voice, face and handwriting data

- Settings: 1000 users, BCH code for generating codewords.
- Methods:
 - Baselines: softmax (regular federated learning with one-hot encoding) and FedAWS [Yu et al., ICML '21].
 - **Our method:** FedUV(c) denotes FedUV with code length of *c*.
- FedUV on par with existing approaches, without sharing embeddings with other users or server.



Thank You!

Paper: https://arxiv.org/abs/2104.08776

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