# **Dynamic Game Theoretic Neural Optimizer**

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
ICML 2021 (Long Talk)

# **Dynamic Game Theoretic Neural Optimizer**

A new class of optimizers for training DNNs that features


- **Dynamic**al system and optimal control perspective
  - Deep learning theory (Weinan et al., 2018; Hu et al., 2019; Liu & Theodorou, 2019)
  - Computational acceleration (Gunther et al., 2020; Zhang et al., 2019)
  - Optimal-control-inspired training methods (*Liu et al., 2021*; *Li & Hao, 2018*; *Li et al., 2017*)
- <u>Game Theoretic</u> interpretation
  - Generalizes OC-inspired methods to a larger network class (e.g. ResNet)
  - Novel algorithmic characterization from Nash equilibria standpoint
  - Enhance training with game-based applications (e.g. bandit analysis, robust control)
- Competitive performance on image classification while being computationally efficient and numerical stabler

#### **Optimal Control Perspective**




- Treat the *propagation of each layer* as a distinct *time step of a nonlinear dynamical system*.
- Interpret *layer parameter* as the *time-varying control* (Weinan et al., 2018; Liu & Theodorou, 2019).
- Rigorous optimization theory and new OC-inspired training method (*Liu et al., 2021*).

#### **Limitation of Optimal Control Perspective**



 OC-inspired methods, by construction, rely on Markovian interpretation between DNNs and dynamical systems. This poses difficulties for training modern networks (*e.g.* ResNet, Inception) that heavily rely on <u>non-Markovian dependencies</u> between layers.

#### **Limitation of Optimal Control Perspective**



- How should the Optimal Control perspective be modified in these cases?
- Do we gain any new optimization insight from such a generalization (if any)?
- Can efficient computation be made possible?

# **Multi-Player Dynamic Game**


In a discrete-time *N*-player *T*-stage dynamic game, Player *n* commits to the action  $\theta_{t,n}$  at each stage *t* and seeks to minimize


$$L_n(\bar{\theta}_n; \bar{\theta}_{\neg n}) \coloneqq \left[ \phi_n(\boldsymbol{x}_T) + \sum_{t=0}^{T-1} \ell_{t,n}(\theta_{t,1}, \cdots, \theta_{t,N}) \right]$$

s.t.  $\boldsymbol{x}_{t+1} = F_t(\boldsymbol{x}_t, \theta_{t,1}, \cdots, \theta_{t,N})$ 

where 
$$ar{ heta}_n:=\{ heta_{t,n}:t\in[T]\}$$
 and  $eg n:=\{i{\in}[N]:i{
eq}n\}.$ 

#### **Terminology Mapping**





#### Guan-Horng Liu (GaTech)


# **Multi-Player Dynamic Game**

• <u>Nash Equilibria</u>  $\{(\bar{\theta}_1^*, \cdots, \bar{\theta}_N^*)\}$  is a set of stationary points where no players has the incentive to deviate, *i.e.* 

$$L_n({ar heta}_n^*;{ar heta}_{
egn}^*) \leq L_n({ar heta}_n;{ar heta}_{
egn}^*),$$

where  ${ar heta}_n^* \equiv {ar heta}_n^*(\eta_{t,n}).$ 

- Information structure  $\eta_{t,n}$  is a set of information available to Player *n* at stage *t* for making the action  $\theta_{t,n}$ .
- Different information structures
  - ⇒ Different Nash equilibria & optimality conditions
  - Different classes of training methods



 $\bar{\theta}_n$ : Collective actions of Player *n* over all stages

 $\neg_n$ : Indices of all players except Player n

#### **Characterize Optimizers via Information Structure**

3 information structures and their Nash equilibria

Open-Loop Nash Equilibria (OLNE)


$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_0\}$$

Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_s: s \leq t\}$$

Cooperative/Group Rationality (GR)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_s, heta^*_{t,
eg n}: s \leq t\}$$



 $\bar{\theta}_n$ : Collective actions of Player *n* over all stages

 $\neg_n$ : Indices of all players except Player n

#### **Characterize Optimizers via Information Structure**

Connection between OLNE and baseline methods.

Open-Loop Nash Equilibria (OLNE)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_0\}$$

Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_s: s \leq t\}$$

Cooperative/Group Rationality (GR)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_s, heta^*_{t,
eg n}: s \leq t\}$$

**Proposition** (informal; see our paper)


Iteratively solving the optimality condition of <u>OLNE</u> recovers the descent direction of standard training methods, *e.g. SGD, RMSprop, Adam, KFAC*, etc.

 $\bar{\theta}_n$ : Collective actions of Player *n* over all stages

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## **Characterize Optimizers via Information Structure**

DGNOpt iteratively solves FNE or GR.




 $\bar{\theta}_n$ : Collective actions of Player *n* over all stages

 $\neg n$ : Indices of all players except Player *n* 

## Standard Vector vs. DGNOpt Feedback Update

• Computation graph of parameter update (using <u>OLNE</u>)



Formula of parameter update of Player n at stage t (using <u>OLNE</u>) \*.


$$heta_{t,n} \! \leftarrow \! heta_{t,n} \! + \! \delta heta_{t,n}$$

Open-Loop Nash Equilibria (OLNE)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_0\}$$

## Standard Vector vs. DGNOpt Feedback Update

• Computation graph of parameter update (using <u>FNE</u>)




• Formula of parameter update of Player *n* at stage *t* (using  $\underline{FNE}$ ) • .

$$egin{aligned} heta_{t,n} &\leftarrow heta_{t,n} + \delta heta_{t,n} \ &+ \mathbf{K}_{t,n} (\delta x_t) \end{aligned}$$

Feedback Nash Equilibria (FNE)

$$\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_s: s \leq t\}$$

## Standard Vector vs. DGNOpt Feedback Update




• Formula of parameter update of Player *n* at stage *t* (using <u>*GR*</u>) •

$$egin{aligned} heta_{t,n} &\leftarrow & heta_{t,n} + \widetilde{\delta heta}_{t,n} \left( \delta heta_{t,
egn n} 
ight) \ &+ \widetilde{\mathbf{K}}_{t,n} \left( \delta x_t, \mathbf{K}_{t,
egn n} 
ight) \end{aligned}$$

Cooperative/Group Rationality (GR) $\eta_{t,n} = \{oldsymbol{x}_s, heta^*_{t,
egn} : s \leq t\}$ 


#### **Benefit of Richer Information & Feedback Update**

Improve accuracy (%) of best-tuned baselines across image classification datasets.
 (*i.e.* enlarge information structure from OLNE to FNE/GR)




## **Benefit of Richer Information & Feedback Update**

- Improve accuracy (%) of best-tuned baselines across image classification datasets.
- Superior numerical stability when using unstable hyper-parameter (*e.g.* large LR).
   Feedback compensates internal disturbance and stabilizes propagation.



#### **Benefit of Richer Information & Feedback Update**

- Improve accuracy (%) of best-tuned baselines across image classification datasets.
- Superior numerical stability when using unstable hyper-parameter (*e.g.* large LR).
- Computational efficient compared to second-order baseline.



#### Computation Efficiency of Training ResNet18 on CIFAR100

# **Game-Theoretic Applications**

• Training process of DGNOpt exhibits ambiguity.


Algorithm DGNOpt


Convert DNN to multi-player game.


repeat

Sample data, forward pass, compute loss. Solve Nash equilibria with DGDNpt. **until** converges

- Different alignment strategy yields different game structure.
  - ⇒ What is the optimal alignment strategy?
  - Can we adapt the best-estimated alignment throughout training?







## **Game-Theoretic Applications**

• Integrate DGNOpt with multi-armed bandit (MAB)

Algorithm DGNOpt with MAB


Initialize MAB. **repeat** Select an alignment *m* from MAB. (*pull an arm from MAB*) Convert DNN to multi-player game based on *m*. Sample data, forward pass, compute loss. Solve Nash equilibria with DGDNpt. Compute accuracy and update MAB. (*observe reward of this round, update MAB*) **until** converges

# **Game-Theoretic Applications**

• Integrate DGNOpt with multi-armed bandit (MAB)

Algorithm DGNOpt with MAB Initialize MAB. repeat Select an alignment *m* from MAB. Convert DNN to multi-player game based on *m*. Sample data, forward pass, compute loss. Solve Nash equilibria with DGDNpt. Compute accuracy and update MAB. until converges Table. Training result (accuracy %)


Dataset	EKFAC	DGNOpt + Aligning Strategy		
		fixed	random	adaptive
SVHN	87.49	88.20	88.12	88.33
CIFAR10	84.67	85.20	85.27	85.65



#### Conclusion

<u>Dynamic</u> <u>Game-theoretic</u> <u>Neural</u> <u>Opt</u>imizer (DGNOpt) is a new class of training optimizers that

- advances the dynamical system methodology.
- introduces riguous game-theoretic analysis.
   (e.g. information structure, Nash equilibria)
- generalizes prior OC-inspired methods to accept generic (non-Markovian) DNNs.
- enables game-related applications. (e.g. bandit, robust control)
- strengthens Optimal Control as a principle tool of analyzing deep learning optimization.



#### Reference

Weinan et al., 2018, "A mean-field optimal control formulation of deep learning." Hu et al., 2019, "Mean-field langevin system, optimal control and deep neural networks." Liu & Theodorou, 2019, "Deep learning theory review: An optimal control and dynamical systems perspective." Gunther et al., 2020, "Layer-parallel training of deep residual neural networks." Zhang et al., 2019, "You only propagate once: Accelerating adversarial training via maximal principle." Liu et al., 2021, "DDPNOpt: Differential dynamic programming neural optimizer." Li & Hao, 2018, "An optimal control approach to deep learning and applications to discrete-weight neural networks." Li et al., 2017, "Maximum principle based algorithms for deep learning."