

# Sever: A Robust Meta-Algorithm for Stochastic Optimization

Ilias Diakonikolas<sup>1</sup>, Gautam Kamath<sup>2</sup>, Daniel M. Kane<sup>3</sup>,  
Jerry Li<sup>4</sup>, Jacob Steinhardt<sup>5</sup>, Alistair Stewart<sup>1</sup>

(alphabetical order)

<sup>1</sup>USC    <sup>2</sup>Waterloo    <sup>3</sup>UCSD    <sup>4</sup>MSR AI    <sup>5</sup>Berkeley

## DEFENDING AGAINST DATA POISONING

**Main question: can you learn a good classifier from poisoned training data?**

# DEFENDING AGAINST DATA POISONING

**Main question: can you learn a good classifier from poisoned training data?**

Given a labeled training set, where an (unknown)  $\varepsilon$ -fraction of them are **adversarially corrupted**, can we learn a model which **achieves good accuracy on a clean test set?**

# DEFENDING AGAINST DATA POISONING


**Main question: can you learn a good classifier from poisoned training data?**

Example: Training an SVM with 3% poisoned data

# DEFENDING AGAINST DATA POISONING

**Main question: can you learn a good classifier from poisoned training data?**

Example: Training an SVM with 3% poisoned data



[Koh-Steinhardt-Liang '18]

Against known defenses, the test error can go up to 30%!

# DEFENDING AGAINST DATA POISONING

## Main question: can you learn a good classifier from poisoned training data?

Example: Training an SVM with 3% poisoned data

Lots of work on related problems:

[Barreno-Nelson-Joseph-Tygar'10, Nasrabadi-Tran-Nguyen'11, Biggio-Nelson-Laskov'12, Nguyen-Tran'13, Newell-Potharaju-Xiang-Nita-Rotaru'14, Bhatia-Jain-Kar'15, Diakonikolas-Kamath-Kane-L-Moitra-Stewart'16, Bhatia-Jain-Kamalaruban-Kar'17, Balakrishnan-Du-L-Singh'17, Charikar-Steinhardt-Valiant'17, Steinhardt-Koh-Liang'17, Koh-Liang'17, Prasad-Suggala-Balakrishnan-Ravikumar'18, Diakonikolas-Kong-Stewart'18, Klivans-Kothari-Meka'18, Koh-Steinhardt-Liang'18...]

Test error

Against known defenses, the test error can go up to 90%!

# OUR RESULTS

We present a framework for robust stochastic optimization

- **Strong theoretical guarantees** against strong adversarial models
- **Outperforms benchmark defenses** on state-of-the-art data poisoning attacks
- Works well in **high dimensions**
- Works with **black-box access** to any learner for any stochastic optimization task

# SEVER

**Idea:** Until termination:


1. train black box learner to find approximate minima of empirical risk on corrupted training set,
2. then run outlier detection method on the gradients of the loss functions at ERM to remove suspected outliers



# SEVER

**Idea:** Until termination:

1. train black box learner to find approximate minima of empirical risk on corrupted training set,
2. then run outlier detection method on the gradients of the loss functions at ERM to remove suspected outliers



# FILTERING AND ROBUST MEAN ESTIMATION

How should we detect outliers from the gradients?

# FILTERING AND ROBUST MEAN ESTIMATION

How should we detect outliers from the gradients?

We exploit a novel connection to **robust mean estimation**

# FILTERING AND ROBUST MEAN ESTIMATION

How should we detect outliers from the gradients?

We exploit a novel connection to **robust mean estimation**

**Filtering [DKKLMS16, DKKLMS17]:** Given a set of points  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  drawn from a “nice” distribution, but where an  $\varepsilon$ -fraction are corrupted, there is a linear time algorithm which either:

# FILTERING AND ROBUST MEAN ESTIMATION

How should we detect outliers from the gradients?

We exploit a novel connection to **robust mean estimation**

**Filtering [DKKLMS16, DKKLMS17]:** Given a set of points  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  drawn from a “nice” distribution, but where an  $\varepsilon$ -fraction are corrupted, there is a linear time algorithm which either:

1. Certifies that the true mean is close to the empirical mean of the corrupted dataset

# FILTERING AND ROBUST MEAN ESTIMATION

How should we detect outliers from the gradients?

We exploit a novel connection to **robust mean estimation**

**Filtering [DKKLMS16, DKKLMS17]:** Given a set of points  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  drawn from a “nice” distribution, but where an  $\varepsilon$ -fraction are corrupted, there is a linear time algorithm which either:

1. Certifies that the true mean is close to the empirical mean of the corrupted dataset
2. Removes more bad points than good points

# FILTERING AND ROBUST MEAN ESTIMATION

How should we detect outliers from the gradients?

We exploit a novel connection to **robust mean estimation**

**Filtering [DKKLMS16, DKKLMS17]:** Given a set of points  $X_1, \dots, X_n$  drawn from a “nice” distribution, but where an  $\varepsilon$ -fraction are corrupted, there is a linear time algorithm which either:

1. Certifies that the true **gradient of the loss function** is close to **0**
2. Removes more bad points than good points

# GUARANTEES

**Theorem (informal):** Suppose we have a distribution  $\mathcal{D}$  over convex functions  $f$ , and  $\text{Cov} [\nabla f(\theta)] \preceq \sigma^2 I$ . Suppose we have  $f_1(\theta), f_2(\theta), \dots, f_n(\theta)$  drawn from  $\mathcal{D}$ , where  $\varepsilon$ -fraction of them are adversarial. Under mild assumptions on  $\mathcal{D}$ , then given enough samples, SEVER outputs a  $\hat{\theta}$  so that w.h.p.

$$\bar{f}(\hat{\theta}) - \min_{\theta} f(\theta) < O\left(\sqrt{\sigma^2 \varepsilon}\right).$$




Can also give results for non-convex objectives

Sample complexity / runtime are polynomial but not super tight

For GLMs (e.g. SVM, regression), we obtain tight(er) bounds




# EMPIRICAL EVALUATION: REGRESSION




# EMPIRICAL EVALUATION: SVM



SVM: Strongest attacks against **gradientCentered** on Enron



SVM: Strongest attacks against **loss** on Enron




SVM: Strongest attacks against **SEVER** on Enron



# CONCLUSIONS

Main question: can you learn a good classifier from **poisoned data**?

Sever is a **meta-algorithm** for robust stochastic optimization



Based on connections to **robust mean estimation**

**Interested? See poster #143 this evening!**