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Poster
Sparsified Linear Programming for Zero-Sum Equilibrium Finding
Brian Zhang · Tuomas Sandholm

Thu Jul 16 06:00 AM -- 06:45 AM &amp; Thu Jul 16 06:00 PM -- 06:45 PM (PDT) @ Virtual #None

Computational equilibrium finding in large zero-sum extensive-form imperfect-information games has led to significant recent AI breakthroughs. The fastest algorithms for the problem are new forms of counterfactual regret minimization (Brown & Sandholm, 2019). In this paper we present a totally different approach to the problem, which is competitive and often orders of magnitude better than the prior state of the art. The equilibrium-finding problem can be formulated as a linear program (LP) (Koller et al., 1994), but solving it as an LP has not been scalable due to the memory requirements of LP solvers, which can often be quadratically worse than CFR-based algorithms. We give an efficient practical algorithm that factors a large payoff matrix into a product of two matrices that are typically dramatically sparser. This allows us to express the equilibrium-finding problem as a linear program with size only a logarithmic factor worse than CFR, and thus allows linear program solvers to run on such games. With experiments on poker endgames, we demonstrate in practice, for the first time, that modern linear program solvers are competitive against even game-specific modern variants of CFR in solving large extensive-form games, and can be used to compute exact solutions unlike iterative algorithms like CFR.

#### Author Information

##### Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

Tuomas Sandholm is Angel Jordan Professor of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. He is Founder and Director of the Electronic Marketplaces Laboratory. He has published over 450 papers. With his student Vince Conitzer, he initiated the study of automated mechanism design in 2001. In parallel with his academic career, he was Founder, Chairman, and CTO/Chief Scientist of CombineNet, Inc. from 1997 until its acquisition in 2010. During this period the company commercialized over 800 of the world's largest-scale generalized combinatorial multi-attribute auctions, with over $60 billion in total spend and over$6 billion in generated savings. He is Founder and CEO of Optimized Markets, Strategic Machine, and Strategy Robot. Also, his algorithms run the UNOS kidney exchange, which includes 69% of the transplant centers in the US. He has developed the leading algorithms for several general classes of game. The team that he leads is the two-time world champion in computer Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold’em poker, and Libratus became the first and only AI to beat top humans at that game. Among his many honors are the NSF Career Award, inaugural ACM Autonomous Agents Research Award, Sloan Fellowship, Carnegie Science Center Award for Excellence, Edelman Laureateship, Newell Award for Research Excellence, and Computers and Thought Award. He is Fellow of the ACM, AAAI, and INFORMS. He holds an honorary doctorate from the University of Zurich.