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Talk
Regret Minimization in Behaviorally-Constrained Zero-Sum Games
Gabriele Farina · Christian Kroer · Tuomas Sandholm

Mon Aug 07 10:30 PM -- 10:48 PM (PDT) @ C4.5
in Game theory and multiagents »

No-regret learning has emerged as a powerful tool for solving extensive-form games. This was facilitated by the counterfactual-regret minimization (CFR) framework, which relies on the instantiation of regret minimizers for simplexes at each information set of the game. We use an instantiation of the CFR framework to develop algorithms for solving behaviorally-constrained (and, as a special case, perturbed in the Selten sense) extensive-form games, which allows us to compute approximate Nash equilibrium refinements. Nash equilibrium refinements are motivated by a major deficiency in Nash equilibrium: it provides virtually no guarantees on how it will play in parts of the game tree that are reached with zero probability. Refinements can mend this issue, but have not been adopted in practice, mostly due to a lack of scalable algorithms. We show that, compared to standard algorithms, our method finds solutions that have substantially better refinement properties, while enjoying a convergence rate that is comparable to that of state-of-the-art algorithms for Nash equilibrium computation both in theory and practice.

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Author Information

Gabriele Farina (Carnegie Mellon University)
Christian Kroer (Carnegie Mellon University)
Tuomas Sandholm (Carnegie Mellon University)

Tuomas Sandholm is Angel Jordan Professor of Computer Science at Carnegie Mellon University. He is Founder and Director of the Electronic Marketplaces Laboratory. He has published over 450 papers. With his student Vince Conitzer, he initiated the study of automated mechanism design in 2001. In parallel with his academic career, he was Founder, Chairman, and CTO/Chief Scientist of CombineNet, Inc. from 1997 until its acquisition in 2010. During this period the company commercialized over 800 of the world's largest-scale generalized combinatorial multi-attribute auctions, with over $60 billion in total spend and over $6 billion in generated savings. He is Founder and CEO of Optimized Markets, Strategic Machine, and Strategy Robot. Also, his algorithms run the UNOS kidney exchange, which includes 69% of the transplant centers in the US. He has developed the leading algorithms for several general classes of game. The team that he leads is the two-time world champion in computer Heads-Up No-Limit Texas Hold’em poker, and Libratus became the first and only AI to beat top humans at that game. Among his many honors are the NSF Career Award, inaugural ACM Autonomous Agents Research Award, Sloan Fellowship, Carnegie Science Center Award for Excellence, Edelman Laureateship, Newell Award for Research Excellence, and Computers and Thought Award. He is Fellow of the ACM, AAAI, and INFORMS. He holds an honorary doctorate from the University of Zurich.

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