



ICML
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On Machine Learning




LAMDA
Learning And Mining from Data

Fast Rates in Time-Varying Strongly Monotone Games



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Time-Varying Games

□ Nash equilibriums

a stable set of decisions where no player has incentives to deviate

□ Protocol

At each round $t = 1, 2, \dots, T$:

- each player ($i \in [N]$) submits $x_{t,i} \in \mathcal{X}_i \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ respectively
- simultaneously, environments reveal a group of *time-varying* utility functions $u_{t,i} : \mathcal{X} \mapsto \mathbb{R}^+$ for each player, where $\mathcal{X} \triangleq \mathcal{X}_1 \times \dots \times \mathcal{X}_N$
- the i -th player suffers loss $u_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t)$ and receives $v_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t) \triangleq \nabla_{x_{t,i}} u_{t,i}(x_{t,i}; x_{t,-i})$, where $\mathbf{x}_t \triangleq (x_{t,1}, \dots, x_{t,N})$

The goal of time-varying games is chasing the time-varying Nash equilibriums


Monotone Games

- A general class containing many games of interest

Monotone games: $\langle v(\mathbf{x}) - v(\mathbf{y}), \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y} \rangle \geq 0$

Zero-sum games

Example: rock-paper-scissors game




Time-varying zero-sum games: [Zhang et al., 2022]

Strongly monotone games

$$\langle v(\mathbf{x}) - v(\mathbf{y}), \mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y} \rangle \geq \mu \|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}\|_2^2$$

Example: Cournot competition



Time-varying strongly monotone games: **this work**

Measures and Results

□ Performance Measure: *tracking error* $\sum_{t=1}^T \|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_t^*\|^2$

□ Non-Stationarity Measure

measure the distance to Nash equilibriums

- *Path length*: $P_T \triangleq \sum_{t=2}^T \|\mathbf{x}_t^* - \mathbf{x}_{t-1}^*\|$

- *Gradient variation*: $V_T \triangleq \sum_{t=2}^T \sup_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \|v_t(\mathbf{x}) - v_{t-1}(\mathbf{x})\|^2$


- *Gradient variance*: $W_T \triangleq \sum_{t=1}^T \sup_{\mathbf{x} \in \mathcal{X}} \|v_t(\mathbf{x}) - \bar{v}_T(\mathbf{x})\|^2$

□ Results

Setups	Works	Time-Varying Games	Time-Invariant Games
Non-Smooth Games	Duvocelle et al. (2023)	$\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T} + T^{2/3} P_T^{1/3})$	$\mathcal{O}(\sqrt{T})$
	This Paper (Theorem 3)	$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1 + \min\{T^{1/3} P_T^{2/3}, W_T\})$	$\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1)$
Smooth Games	This Paper (Theorem 5)	$\mathcal{O}(\min\{\sqrt{(1 + V_T + P_T)(1 + P_T)}, 1 + W_T\})$	$\mathcal{O}(1)$

Non-Smooth Games

Existing Method [Duvocelle et al., 2021]




Algorithm: single model with periodic restarts, can achieve $\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{T} + T^{2/3} P_T^{1/3}\right)$

Our Method: *Online Ensemble*

$$\text{DIST-ERR} \triangleq \sum_{t=1}^T \|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_t^*\|^2 \leq \sum_{t=1}^T \langle v_t(\mathbf{x}_t), \mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_t^* \rangle \leq \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T \langle v_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t), x_{t,i} - x_{t,i}^* \rangle$$

(a *dynamic regret minimization* problem)



Algorithm: OGD as base algorithm with different step sizes, Hedge as meta algorithm

Result: can achieve $\mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{T(1 + P_T)}\right)$ without knowing $P_T \triangleq \sum_{t=2}^T \|\mathbf{x}_t^* - \mathbf{x}_{t-1}^*\|$ in advance

An initial improvement due to the refined non-stationarity handling.

Non-Smooth Games

□ A further improvement by exploiting problem structure

Proposition 1. *The tracking error can be upper-bounded by*

$$\mu \sum_{t=1}^T \|\mathbf{x}_t - \mathbf{x}_t^*\|^2 \leq 2 \sum_{i=1}^N \sum_{t=1}^T (\ell_{t,i}(x_{t,i}) - \ell_{t,i}(x_{t,i}^*)),$$

(strong convexity from strong monotonicity)

where $\ell_{t,i}(x) \triangleq \langle v_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t), x \rangle + \frac{\mu}{2} \|x - x_{t,i}\|^2$ is a μ -strongly convex surrogate loss.

Methods for *non-stationary online learning with strongly convex losses* can be used [Baby and Wang, 2022]

Result: $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}\left(1 + T^{1/3} P_T^{2/3}\right) \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{T(1 + P_T)}\right) \leq \mathcal{O}\left(\sqrt{T} + T^{2/3} P_T^{1/3}\right)$

Advantages: $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} - \tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1) \text{ recovers the best-known static bound} \\ - \text{ still does not require } P_T \text{ as input} \\ - T^{1/3} P_T^{2/3} \text{ improves } T^{2/3} P_T^{1/3} \end{array} \right.$



An orthogonal result of $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(1 + W_T)$ can be found in the paper.

Smooth Games

- Exploiting smoothness for *faster* rates

$$\textit{Smoothness: } \|v_t(\mathbf{x}) - v_t(\mathbf{y})\| \leq L\|\mathbf{x} - \mathbf{y}\|$$

Common in literature: e.g., satisfied by *two-player zero-sum games* $f(\mathbf{x}, \mathbf{y}) = \mathbf{x}^\top A \mathbf{y}$

$$\|\nabla f(\mathbf{x}_1, \mathbf{y}_1) - \nabla f(\mathbf{x}_2, \mathbf{y}_2)\| = \|(A\mathbf{y}_1, -A\mathbf{x}_1) - (A\mathbf{y}_2, -A\mathbf{x}_2)\| \leq \|A\| \|(\mathbf{y}_1 - \mathbf{y}_2, \mathbf{x}_2 - \mathbf{x}_1)\|$$

- Dynamic Regret bounded by Variation in Utilities (DRVU) [\[Zhang et al., 2022\]](#)

If each player runs a single-layer algorithm:

$$\sum_{t=1}^T \langle v_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t), x_{t,i} - x_{t,i}^* \rangle \lesssim \frac{1 + P_{T,i}}{\eta_i} + \eta_i(1 + V_T) + \eta_i \sum_{j=1}^N S_j - \frac{1}{\eta_i} S_i$$

where $S_j \triangleq \sum_{t=2}^T \|x_{t,j} - x_{t-1,j}\|^2$ *Regret summation over all players brings cancellations and faster rates*

Smooth Games

Algorithm 2 TV-SMOG (smooth) for the i -th player

Input: step size pool \mathcal{H}_i^η (D.18)

Initialize: M instances of OOGD $\mathcal{A}_1, \dots, \mathcal{A}_M$ with step size $\eta_{i,j} \in \mathcal{H}_i^\eta$

for $t = 1, \dots, T$ **do**

 Receive $x_{t,i,j}$ from \mathcal{A}_j

 Submit $x_{t,i} = \sum_{j=1}^M p_{t,i,j} x_{t,i,j}$

 Receive gradient feedback $v_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t)$

 Construct loss $\ell_{t,i}$ and optimism $m_{t,i}$ via (4.3)

 Update to $p_{t+1,i}$ via (4.2) with learning rate $\varepsilon_{t,i}$ (D.7)

for $j = 1, \dots, M$ **do**

 | \mathcal{A}_j updates to $x_{t+1,i,j}$ with optimism $v_{t-1,i}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1})$

end

end

Idea I: online ensemble
(two-layer structure)

Idea II: inject correction
term to bias towards
more stable learners

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Update to $\mathbf{n}_{t+1,i}$ via (4.2) with learning rate $\varepsilon_{t,i}$ (D.7)

Injecting a correction term into feedback loss and optimism

$$\ell_{t,i,j} \triangleq \langle v_{t,i}(\mathbf{x}_t), x_{t,i,j} \rangle + \lambda \|x_{t,i,j} - x_{t-1,i,j}\|^2,$$
$$m_{t,i,j} \triangleq \langle v_{t-1,i}(\mathbf{x}_{t-1}), x_{t,i,j} \rangle + \lambda \|x_{t,i,j} - x_{t-1,i,j}\|^2.$$

end Purpose: bias towards more stable base-learners to make the cancelation in the dynamic regret feasible

Idea I: online ensemble
(two-layer structure)


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Result:


$$\mathcal{O}\left(\min\{\sqrt{(1 + V_T + P_T)(1 + P_T)}, 1 + W_T\}\right)$$

Faster rates: fully independent of T


Experiments




(a) a1a




(b) mushrooms




(c) splice



(d) svmguide3



(e) Cournot



(f) zero-sum

- (a), (b), (c), (d): time-varying ℓ_2 -regularized logistic regression
- (e): time-varying Cournot competition
- (f): time-varying zero-sum strongly convex-concave games

Summary

- **Problem:** time-varying strongly monotone games
- **Algorithms:** robust online algorithms for non-smooth and smooth games
- **Key ingredients:**
 - Online ensemble framework (suitable meta/base learners, correction, etc.)
 - Strong convexity extracted from strong monotonicity
- **Results:** best-known (fast-rate) tracking error guarantees for this problem

Thanks!